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SPEED

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY

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EDITORIAL

The PAAP Journal has progressed gradually in the past four years. We have published four issues on various aspects of public administration, one special issue on "Health Policies" and two on "Tertiary Education". In addition to the printed version, the e-version was introduced in 2013 and was made available for readers free of charge through HKPAA and PolyU SPEED's websites. We are currently negotiating with an international publisher to go for global open access publishing and citations tracking in 2016. We hope this will enhance the Journal's circulation and citations of our authors' articles.

After the last three special issues on Health Policies and Tertiary Education, this issue returns to the general aspects on public administration and policy. The first article is a speech by the Secretary for Justice, Rimsky Yuen, on the past, present and future of the rule of law in Hong Kong, delivered at the AGM and Luncheon of the Hong Kong Public Administration Association on 22 May 2015. Jon S.T. Quah examines the critical importance of political will in combating corruption in Asian countries. James Low then looks at the role of training and development in reforming the civil service in Singapore. Ying-ho Kwong explores the dominance of the business sector in negotiating the minimum wage level in Hong Kong. It is followed by Andrew T.W. Hung who looks at the formation of trans-political vision as a foundation of the tertiary's civic education policy in Hong Kong. Lastly, Vincent W.L. Wong examines the implications for principals on teacher development by the structural change in the advisory committee in Hong Kong.

We wish to thank all the article authors for their contributions to this issue as well as the reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions in helping the authors to improve their articles.

Peter K.W. Fong

Editor-in-Chief

PAAP

President

Hong Kong Public Administration Association

The Past, Present and Future of the Rule of Law in Hong Kong

Rimsky Yuen

Secretary for Justice,
The Hong Kong SAR Government

(Following is the speech by the Secretary for Justice, Mr. Rimsky Yuen, delivered at the AGM and Luncheon of the Hong Kong Public Administration Association, held in the Police Officers' Club on 22 May, 2015.)

Professor (Peter) Fong (President of the Hong Kong Public Administration Association), members of the Hong Kong Public Administration Association, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,

First of all, may I express my gratitude to the President and all the members of your Association for inviting me to this annual event, as well as to give me this opportunity to address such a distinguish audience.

The importance of the science, or perhaps the art, of public administration to a modern society hardly requires further elaboration. Over the years, your Association has made significant contributions in enhancing public understanding on important issues concerning public administration, as well as providing a forum for discussing relevant issues. The works and contribution of your Association are highly commendable.

The luncheon today no doubt also provides a good platform for us to exchange views on issues relevant to public administration. As the Secretary for Justice, the topic I have chosen is "**The Past, Present and Future of the Rule of Law in Hong Kong**".

The Past

For many decades, Hong Kong has been one of the most affluent cities in Asia. Many factors have contributed to our success. One of such factors undoubtedly is the fact that Hong Kong is amongst the very first jurisdictions in the region which recognized the importance of the rule of law and made conscious efforts to safeguard its well-being. Let's take a brief look at the rule of law in our past¹.

In 1842, Hong Kong became a British colony. One of the most significant consequences was the introduction of the common law system, and with it the introduction to Hong Kong of the notion of the rule of law.

It has been suggested that the expression "the rule of law" was coined by the English law professor, Professor Dicey, in 1885, although it has also been suggested that the idea lying behind the expression had a far longer history that could even be

traced back to the time of Aristotle. In short, Professor Dicey's concept of the rule of law is that no one is above the law, and all are subject to the same law administered in the same courts. It was in that spirit that, despite the shortcomings and imperialist assumptions of Hong Kong's early legal system, Chinese men charged with the attempted poisoning of the European community in 1857 were allowed to be tried by jury and acquitted in spite of demands from powerful colonists for their summary execution. It was also in that spirit that the then Chief Justice of Hong Kong, Sir Francis Piggott, had directed rather strongly worded remarks at the then Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Francis May, on the principle that the Government must act in accordance with laws enacted by the legislature in the unreported Supreme Court case of *Lugard v Chu Ping* in 1909.

Since then, Hong Kong has continued to demonstrate its staunch commitment to the rule of law, surviving the testing and controversial Sino-British negotiations that determined Hong Kong's fate in the early 1980s. The importance of the rule of law for the continued prosperity of Hong Kong was well acknowledged by all parties concerned, as evident from the fact that the Basic Law promulgated on April 4, 1990 has included many provisions that protect the rule of law in Hong Kong, to which I will return later.

It is not possible to mention exhaustively all the past events that are responsible for shaping the rule of law in Hong Kong as we know it today on this occasion. But I hope that what I just mentioned would serve to remind ourselves that the present state of the rule of law in Hong Kong did not emerge and continue out of a vacuum. Rather, this remarkable achievement is made possible only because of the hard work and perseverance of the past generations, and it is because of their extraordinary efforts that we are now able to confidently claim that the rule of law is deeply rooted in Hong Kong. Hence, we should treasure the strong foundation built by our past generations by continuing to cherish, safeguard, and strengthen the rule of law for our community's benefit.

The Present

This brings me to the rule of law in the present day world.

Modern Concept of the Rule of Law

The concept of the rule of law has been discussed by many leading commentators and jurists both local and overseas. This is not the occasion to embark upon a detailed analysis of the numerous expositions that have been put forward. However, allow me to highlight a few explanations of the concept, so as to set the scene for further discussion.

One of the most well-known expositions of the concept of the rule of law is the one put forward by the late Lord Bingham, an eminent United Kingdom (UK) judge, who explained that the concept of the rule of law comprises the following eight "sub-

rules", namely²:

- (a) the law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable;
- (b) questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by applications of the law and not the exercise of discretion;
- (c) the laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent that objective differences justify differentiation;
- (d) public officials must exercise the powers conferred on them in good faith, fairly, for the purpose for which the powers were conferred, without exceeding the limits of such powers and not unreasonably;
- (e) the law must afford adequate protection of fundamental human rights;
- (f) means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost or inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the parties themselves are unable to resolve;
- (g) adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair;
- (h) the rule of law requires compliance by the state with its obligations in international law as in national law.

In a similar vein, the former Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Andrew Li, has identified three over-arching principles under the rule of law³:

- (a) first, under the rule of law, everyone, both those who govern and those who are governed, is subject to the same laws;
- (b) second, disputes between citizens and disputes between citizen and government are resolved fairly and impartially by an independent judiciary; and
- (c) third, the rule of law involves the effective protection of human rights.

As I said earlier, there are various other expositions, as well as methodologies and approaches to test the rule of law situation in a specific jurisdiction. Examples include the approach adopted by the Venice Commission's Report on the Rule of Law (2011)⁴, as well as the nine factors adopted in working out the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index⁵. This occasion is also not an occasion to debate which one provides the best definition or methodology. More importantly and pertinently, if I may suggest, is the fact that each of the core elements of the rule of law identified by those leading jurists and institutions is vigilantly safeguarded in Hong Kong. Whilst time does not allow me to discuss each element in detail, let us look at two key aspects so as to have an overview of the current situation in Hong Kong.

Before I do so, I would like to make this preamble. From time to time, some commentators and public figures, both local and overseas, made observations that might

cause concern over the situation of the rule of law in Hong Kong. I would leave it to you to judge whether those observations are correct or justified. However, I would invite you to look at the objective facts, rather than subscribing to subjective or simply bare assertions that cannot withstand scrutiny when tested against objective facts.

The Constitutional Framework

With that preamble, let me start with the first aspect, namely, the constitutional framework. The Basic Law, our quasi-constitution, contains provisions that provide solid safeguards for the rule of law.

A good starting point is Article 8 of the Basic Law, which provides that the laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained. This Article enables the common law system to continue to operate in Hong Kong, which is crucial to the maintenance of the rule of law in Hong Kong.

Article 73 of the Basic Law provides that the Legislative Council of Hong Kong shall exercise the powers and functions of enacting, amending, and repealing laws in accordance with the Basic Law and legal procedures. This Article ensures that legislation is properly scrutinized through a transparent process before it is enacted.

Insofar as the judiciary is concerned, Article 84 of the Basic Law provides that Hong Kong courts shall adjudicate cases in accordance with the laws applicable in Hong Kong and may refer to precedents of other common law jurisdictions. Article 85 of the Basic Law, on the other hand, provides that the courts of Hong Kong shall exercise judicial power independently, free from any interference, and that members of the judiciary shall be immune from legal action in the performance of their judicial functions.

Insofar as protection of human rights is concerned, the relevant provisions in the Basic Law (such as Articles 25 to 39), together with the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (which contains our Bill of Rights), provide firm and clear safeguards.

Independent Judiciary

The second aspect concerns our judiciary. It is well established that an independent judiciary is a core and fundamental element of the rule of law. In Hong Kong, there cannot be any question whatsoever that we have a truly independent judiciary.

One point I have stressed on other occasions, and which I would stress again today, concerns the composition of our Court of Final Appeal. Articles 2 and 19 of our Basic Law provide that Hong Kong enjoys independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. By reason of Article 82, such power of final adjudication is vested in the Court of Final Appeal, which has taken over the role of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

One important aspect to note is that Article 82 permits the invitation of judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the Court of Final Appeal. Since the establishment of the Court of Final Appeal in July 1997, eminent judges and jurists from the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand have been invited to sit on our Court of Final Appeal. Final appeals of all types of cases (including those raising important constitutional issues or concerning important government policies, as well as commercial disputes involving huge amounts) were and still are being heard by a panel of five judges, which invariably include one such overseas judge.

At the moment, we are privileged to have more than 10 such overseas judges who sit at our Court of Final Appeal from time to time. They include Sir Anthony Mason, Lord Neuberger, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Walker and Lord Phillips. All of them are top leading jurists in the common law world. One may therefore legitimately ask these questions: Would these eminent judges be willing to sit in our Court of Final Appeal if they do not enjoy true and complete judicial independence? Or would these eminent judges remain silent if they felt any form of interference in the discharge of their judicial duties? The answers are more than obvious. The fact that Hong Kong can continue to attract such eminent overseas judges to sit in our Court of Final Appeal is a strong testimony to the state of judicial independence and the rule of law in Hong Kong.

Before leaving this area, may I briefly touch on the appointment of judges. In this regard, I would like to quote from a speech made by Mr. Justice Patrick Chan, a former Permanent Judge of the Court of Final Appeal who has served under four Chief Justices (including the current one), which was delivered at his Farewell Sitting in October 2013. Mr. Justice Chan said as follows⁶ :

"There is one thing I have wanted to say for a long time to those who still perceive any doubt about the independence of our Judiciary. Since 1995, I have been involved in the selection of judges, either as a member of the Judicial Service Commission or the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission or the judiciary's internal selection committee. I can bear witness to the fact that there has never been any interference from any quarter or any person in the appointment of judges. All my colleagues were appointed on their own merits."

Other remarks

Since I am wearing the hat of the Secretary for Justice, you may wonder whether I am somehow biased in favour of the positive side of the picture. If you harbour such a thought, let me invite you to look at reports which the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) Government could not possibly have any control over. To give you one example, the latest European Commission's Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council, which is the Annual Report 2014 on the Hong Kong SAR contains these observations:

"The judiciary continued to demonstrate its independence and consistent adherence to due process. During the large civil disobedience campaign, the rule of law remained the guiding principle for the Government, economic actors and the population at large. ... "

"The rule of law was generally respected and the judiciary maintained its high standards in 2014. On several occasions, parties filed for court rulings with significant political implications, but the courts continued to function independently and professionally and were not influenced by extraneous factors or political considerations."

Indeed, the way Hong Kong withstood the Occupy Movement last year, which had created social disorder in our society to levels not seen in decades, is a clear testament to our ability and conviction to uphold the rule of law in times of tremendous difficulties.

The Future

Let's move on to look at the future. I have no crystal ball, but would like to share with you a few thoughts on how to maintain and enhance the rule of law in Hong Kong.

First, to safeguard the rule of law requires the joint efforts of the entire community. To this end, a proper understanding of the concept is of importance. During the Occupy Movement, strange or even fundamentally wrong ideas about the rule of law were put forward. It is fortunate that the Court, when dealing with the injunction applications, has made clear explanations on the rule of law. In this regard, it is pertinent to remind ourselves of the following observations made by the Honourable Mr. Justice Au in the case of *Chiu Luen Public Light Bus Co Ltd*, unrep., HCA 2086/2014, in which he said:

"139. The concept of the rule of law must include and embrace the notion that every resident and the government alike should obey and comply with the law ... the concept of rule of law means that every resident of Hong Kong are governed by and bound to the operation of the law.

...

141. It is therefore wrong for any suggestions that the rule of law is not undermined or under challenge if people can freely or intentionally disobey the law first and then accept the consequences of breaking the law."

Just as we would take measures to prevent bad weather from damaging our homes, so we should be vigilant and always strive to prevent misconceived ideas from dampening our commitment to the rule of law. Promotion and education on the concept of the rule of law are therefore matters of importance.

Second, the Hong Kong SAR is an international and cosmopolitan city. To continue Hong Kong's success story, it is important to ensure that Hong Kong will, on

the one hand, continue as an effective springboard to the Mainland market, and on the other hand, remain an international and cosmopolitan city. It is only by so doing that the Hong Kong SAR can maintain or enhance its competitive edge. To this end, the legal community should remain international, and we should continue to make efforts to attract the best legal talents from relevant jurisdictions so that, first, there could be cross-fertilization (as well as sharing of experience) between the local and overseas talents, and secondly, to maintain the confidence of the international community.

Third, the Hong Kong SAR should prepare itself to stand up to challenges brought about by globalization, regional integration and the advance of technology. These three driving forces that I just mentioned have brought about fundamental changes to the legal landscape at both the international and domestic levels, with direct or indirect impact on the rule of law. Not only should the current generation of the legal community be prepared to embrace the changes, steps should be taken to prepare the future generations of our legal community (if not indeed the entire community) to face such challenges and convert such challenges into opportunities.

Conclusion

Ladies and gentlemen, the rule of law, as many have repeatedly said, is the bedrock or cornerstone of our society. We owe it to ourselves, to Hong Kong as a whole as well as to our future generations to steadfastly maintain the rule of law, so that Hong Kong can continue to prosper, and so that we would all continue to feel proud to call the Hong Kong SAR our "home, sweet home".

On this note, it remains for me to wish you all good health and a well-deserved rest during the long weekend.

Thank you.

Notes

1. For those who are interested in this area, reference can also be made to Steve Tsang (ed), *Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law in Hong Kong* (HKU Press) (2001), Chapter 2 (The Rule of Law and Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century).
2. See Tom Bingham, *The Rule of Law* (Allen Lane) (2010).
3. See Andrew Li, "The Importance of the Rule of Law", (2013) 43 *HKLJ* 795 at 795.
4. European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), *Report on the Rule of Law* (adopted at its 86th plenary session on 25-26 March 2011).
5. They are (1) constraints on government powers; (2) absence of corruption; (3) open government; (4) fundamental rights; (5) order and security; (6) regulatory enforcement; (7) civil justice; (8) criminal justice; and (9) informal justice: see *The World Justice Project: Rule of Law Index 2014*, p. 8.
6. *Farewell Sitting for the Honourable Mr. Justice Chan PJ* (2013) 16 *HKCFAR* 1012, para. 10 at 1019.

The Critical Importance of Political Will in Combating Corruption in Asian Countries

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Abstract

Political will is the most important factor responsible for the success of Singapore and Hong Kong in combating corruption among Asian countries. This article adopts Derick Brinkerhoff's definition of political will and identifies its five indicators. It explains why political will is necessary for effective corruption control and recommends six strategies for developing the political will required for curbing corruption effectively in the Asian countries. It concludes that countries with good governance and strong political will are less corrupt than those countries with poor governance and weak political will.

Keywords: Anti-Corruption Agencies, China, corruption, political will

Introduction

Corruption remains a serious problem in many Asian countries in spite of the many anti-corruption measures introduced during the past six decades. In my analysis of the effectiveness of the anti-corruption measures in ten Asian countries, I found that political will is the critical factor responsible for the success of Singapore and Hong Kong in curbing corruption (Quah, 2011, p.456). What is political will? Why is political will needed for ensuring effective corruption control? How can those Asian countries afflicted with rampant corruption nurture the political will needed to minimize corruption? These three questions will be addressed in turn in this article.

What is Political Will?

Political will has been defined in various ways by many scholars. In reviewing the literature on the definitions on political will, Lori Ann Post, Amber Raile and Eric Raile (2010, pp. 657-658) conclude that political will is "a complex, multifaceted concept" which focuses on these three aspects: (1) the "distribution of preferences with regard to the outcome of interest"; (2) the "authority, capacity, and legitimacy of key decision makers or reformers"; and (3) the "commitment to preferences." Building on previous definitions, they define political will as "the extent of committed support among key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a particular problem." This definition is useful because it dissects the concept of political will into these four components: (1) a sufficient set of decision makers; (2) with a common understanding of a particular problem on the formal agenda; (3) is committed to supporting; and (4) a commonly

perceived, potentially effective policy solution (Post, Raile and Raile, 2010, p. 659).

Unlike the general definition provided by Post, Raile and Raile, Sahr J. Kpundeh (1998, p. 92) has defined "political will" as "the demonstrated credible intent of political actors (elected or appointed leaders, civil society watchdogs, stakeholder groups, etc.) to attack perceived causes or effects of corruption at a systemic level." However, a more useful definition is provided by Derick W. Brinkerhoff (2000, p. 242) who defines political will as "the commitment of actors to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives - in this case, anti-corruption policies and programmes - and to sustain the costs of those actions over time." Elected or appointed leaders and public agency senior officials are expected by their citizens to manifest political will in combating corruption.

There are five indicators of political will. First, there must be comprehensive anti-corruption legislation. Second, the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) must be provided with adequate personnel, budget, and equipment as well as operational autonomy to enable them to perform their functions effectively. Third, the anti-corruption laws must be enforced impartially, regardless of the offender's position, status, or political affiliation, and without political interference. Fourth, political will exists when the government avoids the use of corruption as a weapon against its political opponents. Fifth, anti-corruption efforts must be sustained and their impact must be monitored by the government.

Political Will and Effective Corruption Control

Political will is needed for effective corruption control for three reasons. The first reason is that combating corruption is expensive as the ACAs need sufficient personnel, budget and equipment to enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially. Indeed, without political will, the ACAs will not be provided with the required personnel, budget and equipment because "the principal people who can change a culture of corruption if they wish to do so are politicians" as they "make the laws and allocate the funds that enable the laws to be enforced" (Senior, 2006, pp. 184, 187).

Table 1: Per Capita Expenditure of Nine Anti-Corruption Agencies in 2008

Anti-Corruption Agency	Budget	Population	Per Capita Expenditure	Rank
ICAC Hong Kong	US\$97.7 m	7.3 m	US\$13.40	1 st
CPIB Singapore	US\$11.2 m	4.8 m	US\$2.32	2 nd
ACRC South Korea	US\$61.0 m	48.4 m	US\$1.26	3 rd
IAAC Mongolia	US\$3.1 m	2.7 m	US\$1.15	4 th
NACC Thailand	US\$21.3 m	64.3 m	US\$0.33	5 th
OMB Philippines	US\$19.6 m	89.7 m	US\$0.22	6 th
MJIB Taiwan	US\$4.0 m	22.9 m	US\$0.18	7 th
KPK Indonesia	US\$31.8 m	234.3 m	US\$0.14	8 th
CBI India	US\$52.1 m	1,186.2 m	US\$0.04	9 th

Source: Quah (2011, p. 455, Table 12.9).

Perhaps the most important indicator of a government's political will is the budget allocated by it to the ACA for performing its anti-corruption functions. The different levels of political will in combating corruption in nine Asian countries are reflected in the per capita expenditure of their ACAs. Table 1 shows that Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) has the highest per capita expenditure of US\$13.40, followed by Singapore's Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) (US\$2.32), South Korea's Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) (US\$1.26), Mongolia's Independent Authority Against Corruption (IAAC) (US\$1.15), Thailand's National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) (US\$0.33), Philippines' Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) (US\$0.22), Taiwan's Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB) (US\$0.18), Indonesia's *Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi* (KPK or Corruption Eradication Commission) (US\$0.14) and India's Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) (US\$0.04). Consequently, it is not surprising that Singapore and Hong Kong have succeeded in curbing corruption because of the strong political will of their governments as manifested in the high per capita expenditure of their ACAs.

The second reason why political will is needed for curbing corruption effectively is that corrupt individuals and organizations are powerful and have vested interests to circumvent the anti-corruption laws to avoid arrest and conviction for their offences. Hence, governments must provide the ACAs with adequate resources and operational autonomy to enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially and effectively. Corruption is a formidable foe to defeat because corrupt individuals are highly intelligent and capable of finding legal loopholes or other methods to circumvent the anti-corruption laws. For example, Bernard Madoff was "smart, savvy, and experienced at bucking the system" (Sander, 2009, p. 223). Similarly, according to James McGregor (2012, p. 112) those persons who became rich during China's years of development "often through political connections and corruption" are "usually the major roadblock to reform" because "reforms threaten their financial fortunes, and leave them vulnerable politically, just as the middle class gains power and pushes for transparency and rule of law."

Thirdly, fighting corruption is a difficult and complex task because it is necessary to identify the causes of corruption and to recommend appropriate measures to address these causes over a sustained period of time. Often, governments fail to conduct this analysis. Christian Gobel (2004) has described the difficult tasks of combating political corruption, organized crime, and vote-buying in Taiwan as "beheading the Hydra," the Greek mythical creature with several heads that grew again when cut off. In the same vein, Laurence Cockcroft (2012, pp. 231-232) has described corruption as "a snake which will frequently respond with poison, and will only die with repeated attack" and "only if severed at the head."

Strategies for Nurturing Political Will

In a recent interview, Bertrand de Speville (2013, p. 19), a former ICAC Commissioner in Hong Kong, has aptly described the fragility of political will by

referring to it as "a candle flame" which can be easily "extinguished by any passing political breeze." Political will is needed not only to initiate comprehensive anti-corruption measures to address the causes of corruption, but also to sustain the impartial implementation of these measures over a long period of time.

Political will can be generated from the top down by the government and public agencies and/or from the bottom up by civil society organizations (CSOs) and the mass media. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2008, pp. 152-155) has recommended a seven-point agenda for action to combat corruption in the Asia Pacific countries, which includes a two-pronged approach that combines "both top-down and bottom-up anti-corruption efforts to ensure that political will is present to keep governments and citizens 'clean'" (Rajivan and Gampart, 2009, p. 755). There are six strategies for nurturing political will to curb corruption in Asian countries.

1. Elect competent and honest persons to political office.

This first strategy is important but difficult to implement in many Asian countries because of two obstacles. The first obstacle is the criminalization of politics in some Asian countries, which enable criminals to compete in elections. In India, 120 (22 per cent) of the 543 Members of Parliament elected in 2004 had criminal cases involving murder, robbery and rape against them (Chishti, 2009, p. xv). In Taiwan, it was estimated in 1995 that 37.8 per cent of town representatives had organized crime backgrounds, followed by 26.5 per cent of county and city councillors, and 3 per cent of the national representatives (Quah, 2011, p. 169). Kevin Casas-Zamora (2013, pp. 7-8) explains why the connection between organized crime and political finance is important thus:

The capture of parties and elected officials by moneyed interests is bad news for democracy in the best of cases. ... The capture of parties, leaders, and institutions by the perpetrators of illicit activities has one overarching goal: the hollowing out of the rule of law. ... Organized crime normally seeks to prevent the law from being enforced altogether. Moreover, it does so by resorting to violence if necessary.

The second obstacle encountered is the prevalence of vote-buying in some Asian countries which means that only those candidates with financial resources or sponsors can afford to compete for public office through elections. In India, it is "impossible to run an election campaign without illicit funds" because candidates in the 2009 general election were estimated to have spent US\$2 million to US\$3 million each even though each candidate was allowed to spend only US\$55,000 (French, 2013, p. 70). In Taiwan, the MJIB investigated 2,327 vote-buying cases from 1993-2009. In November 2001, 3,509 vote captains, who were arrested for bribery cases, were linked to the December 2001 legislative election (Quah, 2011, p. 168). In Thailand, 30 million baht were spent on buying votes in the 1996 election. The candidates in the 2001 election spent 30 billion baht (US\$75 million) (Quah, 2011, p. 292).

Table 2: Public Trust in Politicians and Corruption Perceptions Index Scores of 22 Asian Countries in 2014

Country	Public Trust in Politicians Rank & Score (N=144)	Corruption Perceptions Index Rank & Score (N=175)
Singapore	1 st (6.2)	7 th (84)
Hong Kong	18 th (4.6)	17 th (74)
Malaysia	17 th (4.7)	50 th (52)
Lao PDR	29 nd (3.9)	145 th (25)
Bhutan	24 th (4.1)	30 th (65)
Taiwan	30 th (3.9)	35 th (61)
China	26 th (4.1)	100 th (36)
Japan	21 st (4.5)	15 th (76)
Vietnam	49 th (3.4)	119 th (31)
Indonesia	37 th (3.6)	107 th (34)
Timor-Leste	75 th (3.0)	133 rd (28)
Cambodia	91 st (2.6)	156 th (21)
Myanmar	72 nd (3.0)	157 th (21)
Philippines	89 th (2.6)	85 th (38)
Sri Lanka	85 th (2.7)	85 th (38)
Pakistan	108 th (2.3)	126 th (29)
South Korea	97 th (2.4)	43 rd (55)
India	50 th (3.4)	85 th (38)
Mongolia	119 th (2.1)	80 th (39)
Thailand	129 th (1.9)	85 th (38)
Bangladesh	136 th (1.8)	145 th (25)
Nepal	122 nd (2.1)	126 th (29)

Sources: Schwab (2014, p. 409) and Transparency International (2014).

The level of public trust in politicians tends to be higher in Singapore and Hong Kong, which have been effective in curbing corruption, than in Bangladesh and Nepal, which have very high levels of perceived corruption. Table 2 shows the relationship between public trust in politicians and the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores of 22 Asian countries in 2014.

2. Establish a single, independent ACA instead of multiple ACAs.

If the government and citizens in those Asian countries afflicted by widespread corruption wish to improve the status quo, what can they do? They have three options. The first option, which should be avoided, is not to follow the examples of China, India, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam, which have continued to rely for many years on ineffective multiple ACAs to address the problem of rampant corruption, without success. The multiple ACAs in these five countries are ineffective because of their overlapping functions, lack of coordination, and competition for limited resources, which has resulted in "turf wars" among themselves (Quah, 2013a, p. 241). The second option, which is practised by Denmark, Finland and New Zealand, is to strengthen existing institutions in the country without creating an ACA. The final option in combating corruption was initiated by the creation of the CPIB in Singapore in October 1952, and emulated by the establishment of the ICAC in Hong Kong in February 1974 (Quah, 2013a, p. 250).

The success of the CPIB and ICAC in curbing corruption has led to the proliferation of single ACAs in many Asian countries. However, unlike the CPIB and ICAC, the ACAs in these countries are ineffective in curbing corruption because of their lack of political will and unfavourable policy contexts (Quah, 2013b, pp. 21-22). In other words, the strategy of relying on a single ACA in a country will only be effective if the incumbent government provides it with sufficient legal powers, budget, personnel, and operational autonomy.

3. Political leaders and senior civil servants must be held accountable for their corrupt behaviour.

A government is committed to combating corruption if it ensures that its political leaders and senior civil servants are accountable for their actions, especially if they have committed corrupt acts. Thus, the third strategy for nurturing political will is by holding those political leaders and senior bureaucrats who are corrupt accountable for their misconduct.

In China, the political leaders must demonstrate their political will to minimize corruption by abandoning the protection of corrupt Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members from investigation and prosecution by the procuratorates. Those CCP members found guilty of disciplinary offences are punished according to the severity of their offences, ranging from a warning to the most severe penalty of expulsion from the CCP and transfer to the judicial system for those accused of accepting bribes exceeding 5,000 yuan. Flora Sapio (2005, pp. 8-9) contends that party cadres who are being investigated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) are "shielded by what is generally conceived as a safe nest ensuring their exemption from criminal punishment." Lening Zhang (2001, p. 28) contends that the CCP prefers to punish corrupt party officials by relying on "internal resolution" instead of imposing legal penalties for corrupt offences to save face and prevent the erosion of official authority.

The Discipline Inspection Commissions (DICs) can delay the transfer of criminal corruption cases to the procuratorates to enable the corrupt CCP members to cover their tracks or destroy incriminating evidence. Furthermore, the DICs can also appropriate criminal corruption cases by imposing disciplinary sanctions against corrupt CCP members instead of transferring them to the procuratorates to spare them from harsher legal penalties. Indeed, "by protecting corrupt party members from investigation and prosecution by the procuratorates, the CCP is encouraging its members to be corrupt rather remain honest" (Quah, 2013c, p. 82).

4. Corruption should not be used by the government as a weapon against its political opponents.

As an ACA is a powerful agency, the government should not abuse its powers by using corruption as a weapon against its political opponents. However, in reality, "corruption charges are increasingly used as a means to discredit rivals, rather than as

an effort to clean up politics" because "the tendency to use corruption charges to settle political scores is widespread" in many Asian countries (Djalal, 2001, pp. 32-33).

In China, anti-corruption campaigns have been used against political opponents to undermine their power base in the CCP. According to Joseph Fewsmith (2001, p. 231), "charging one's opponents (or their close followers) with corruption - a charge that seems increasingly true of most officials - had become a weapon of choice for political maneuver" in China. Indeed, "senior party officials like Chen Xitong, Chen Liangyu, and Bo Xilai were prosecuted for corruption not only because they were guilty of corrupt offences, but more importantly, because they had threatened the consolidation of power of political leaders like Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping, respectively" (Quah, 2013c, p. 83). In July 2014, the CCDI investigated Zhou Yongkang, the Minister of Public Security from 2002-2007, for corruption and the procuratorates confiscated US\$16.05 billion worth of assets from his many residences in seven provinces in China (Tang, 2014). Zhou was expelled from the CCP on December 5, 2014, not only because of his corruption offences but more importantly for his conspiracy with Bo Xilai to challenge the leadership of Xi Jinping.

Political leaders in China will fail to minimize corruption if they continue to rely on using corruption as the weapon of choice against their political foes. In other words, political leaders in Asian countries can demonstrate their political will in curbing corruption by avoiding the use of corruption as a weapon against their political opponents.

5. Those found guilty of corruption must be punished according to the law, regardless of their status, position, or political affiliation.

Corruption thrives in Asian countries like China, India, Indonesia and the Philippines because their citizens perceive it as a low risk, high reward activity as corrupt offenders are unlikely to be detected and punished. By contrast, corruption is perceived as a high risk, low reward activity in Singapore and Hong Kong, which are perceived to be the least corrupt city-states in Asia because corrupt offenders are likely to be caught and severely punished (Quah, 2011, p. 18).

Table 3: Punishment of Chinese Communist Party Cadres in China, 1993-1998

Rank of Cadres	Disciplined by CCP	Investigated by CCP	Sentenced by Courts	Sentenced as % of Disciplined
Provincial/Ministerial	87 (0.3%)	15 (0.1%)	9 (0.5%)	10.3%
Prefect/Department	2,205 (7.6%)	616 (5.0%)	201 (10.5%)	9.1%
County/Division	26,609 (92.1%)	11,712 (94.9%)	1,705 (89.0%)	6.4%
Total	28,901 (100%)	12,343 (100%)	1,915 (100%)	6.6%

Source: Pei (2006, p. 153, Table 4.4).

In China, the low probability of detection and punishment is a major cause of corruption as Minxin Pei (2006, p. 153) found that only 1,915 (or 6.6 per cent) of the 28,901 CCP cadres who were disciplined by the CCP were sentenced by the courts (see

Table 3). This means that if a party member commits a corrupt offence, he or she has only a 6.6 per cent probability of being prosecuted. With such a low probability of being caught for corrupt offences, it is not surprising that many senior officials are willing to assume the low risk for committing such offences (Burns, 2004, pp. 43-44).

Andrew Wedeman (2009, p. 26) compared the impact of the anti-corruption campaigns in China from 1992-1996 and 2005-2006 and found that corruption had deteriorated during the second period as the risk of corrupt offenders being caught was significantly reduced because the time lag between the offence and arrest of the offender increased from 20 months during 1992-1996 to 63 months during 2005-2006. Among the average number of 30,000 public officials charged with economic crimes annually, more than 20,000 officials (66.7 per cent) were remanded to the courts for trial, but only 5,000 officials (16.7 per cent) were imprisoned for five years or more (Wedeman, 2009, p. 27).

Further evidence of the low probability of detecting and punishing corrupt offenders in China is reflected in the low percentage of prosecuting corrupt officials, which varies from 2.9 per cent in 2004 to 13.1 per cent in 2005, even though the number of CCP members punished by the CCDI has increased from 97,260 to 190,000 during 1992-2006. Among the 115,143 CCP members disciplined during 1992-2006, 44,836 (38.9 per cent) were warned, and 32,289 (28 per cent) of them were given a serious warning. This means that two-thirds of those party members who were disciplined "got away with only a mild to serious warning that appeared to have no real punitive consequences" (Pei, 2008, pp. 230-232).

As not all officials who are suspected of corruption and investigated in China are convicted, Yongshun Cai (2015, pp. 130-131) contends that some corrupt officials are punished less severely for three reasons. First, those corrupt officials who are cooperative, make voluntary confessions, provide information on the corruption of other officials, and return illegal income to the government, are punished less severely. Second, some corrupt officials receive less harsh punishment depending on the definition of the amount of money embezzled or bribes received. Third, where there are many corrupt officials, only seriously corrupt officials are punished as the less corrupt officials are exempted from punishment to avoid paralyzing the operations of the city or local government. Indeed, "when the number of corrupt agents becomes too high, curbing corruption becomes too difficult, if not impossible" (Cai, 2015, p. 131). The inconsistencies in investigating and punishing corrupt officials at both the central and local levels in China have undermined the credibility of the disciplinary agencies and encouraged the belief among officials that they would unlikely be punished for corrupt offences (Cai, 2015, p. 133).

In short, the governments in Asian countries must demonstrate their political will in curbing corruption by punishing those found guilty of corruption offences, regardless of their status, position or political affiliation.

6. Rely on CSOs and mass media to curb corruption when the government lacks the political will to do so.

Peter Eigen (2004, p. 13), the founder of Transparency International, contends that when governments and the private sector are unable to curb transnational corruption, environmental destruction, and human rights violations, CSOs have "stepped into the void" in these areas of "failed governance." As many governments in Asian countries have failed to curb corruption effectively, it is not surprising that many CSOs have emerged in these countries to compensate for their governments' inadequacies by launching anti-corruption programmes. Table 4 provides details of the mission and vision of four CSOs in India, Indonesia and the Philippines.

Table 4: Four Asian Civil Society Organizations with Anti-Corruption Programmes

Organization	Country	Mission/Vision
Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government (CCAG)	Philippines (formed in 1986) www.ccagg.com	To establish a self-reliant community of a potentially mature and economically emancipated citizenry who work for good government.
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ)	Philippines (formed in 1989) www.pcij.org	Promoting investigative reporting on current issues in Philippine society and encouraging the development of investigative journalism within the Philippine press.
Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW)	Indonesia (formed in 1998) www.antikorupsi.org	To support the creation of a clean bureaucracy, politics and economic system.
5 th Pillar (zero rupee note with anti-bribes pledge)	India (formed in 2008) www.5thpillar.org	To encourage, enable and empower every citizen of India to eliminate corruption at all levels of society.

Source: Compiled by the author from the websites of the four CSOs.

A strong civil society is critical for combating corruption because it provides the ACAs with critical information and feedback, a framework of values, an organizational base and skills needed by citizens to act on shared problems, and alternatives to mistreatment by corrupt officials. In other words, a strong civil society reduces the costs of corruption by providing its members with the space and organizational capabilities required to act against corruption (Johnston and Kpundeh, 2005, pp. 151, 163).

Unfortunately, the CSOs in Asian countries have encountered many obstacles in combating corruption namely: a hostile environment, limited resources, and the fact that many of their members are concerned with basic survival needs. Consequently, CSOs in those poor, highly corrupt and undemocratic Asian countries face many constraints and find it difficult to develop and survive. Indeed, without adequate resources and the ability to influence those in power, the anti-corruption efforts of CSOs in many Asian

countries are ineffective and "more likely to result in risk, repression and apathy" (UNDP, 2008, p. 139).

Conclusion

Denmark and New Zealand were ranked first and second respectively on Transparency International's 2014 CPI with scores of 92 and 91, followed by Finland, which was ranked third with a score of 89. Among the Asian countries, Singapore and Hong Kong SAR were ranked 7th and 17th with scores of 84 and 74, respectively. On the other hand, India was ranked 85th among the 175 countries with a score of 38. Why are the first five countries more effective than India in curbing corruption?

The short answer is: good governance and political will. ... The governments of the five richer countries are committed not only to minimizing corruption, but also to ensuring good governance. ... If a country is well governed like the five countries, it is less likely to suffer from corruption if the government implements impartially the anti-corruption measures. On the other hand, if a country is poorly governed like India, it is more likely to be afflicted by rampant corruption because the government lacks the political will to implement impartially the anti-corruption measures (Quah, 2013a, pp. 236-237).

The government's lack of political will in curbing corruption in India has resulted in citizens being subjected to the daily routine and frustrations of petty corruption, as reflected in the complaints by two software engineers. First, Varun Mishra has lamented that "You pay for a birth certificate, a death certificate. All your life you pay. And for what? For things that should be free" (quoted in Burke, 2011, p. 3). Second, Ballaji, a 24-year old information technology engineer from Chennai protested against corruption in India in April 2011 because "everyone's corrupt, all of us, and it has to end ... When I drive my car badly and get stopped [by the police], I pay a bribe. If I want a birth certificate or a copy of my school certificate, I pay a bribe. Whenever I have any sort of dealing with the government, I pay a bribe." (quoted in Astill, 2013, p. 248).

Table 5: Linkage between Fragile States in Asia and Corruption

Country	Fragile States Index 2014 Rank & Score (N = 178)	Corruption Perceptions Index 2014 Rank & Score (N = 175)
Afghanistan	7 th (106.5)	172 nd (12)
Pakistan	10 th (103.0)	126 th (29)
Myanmar	24 th (94.3)	156 th (21)
North Korea	26 th (94.0)	174 th (8)
Bangladesh	29 th (92.8)	145 th (25)
Sri Lanka	30 th (92.6)	85 th (38)
Nepal	31 st (91.0)	126 th (29)
Timor-Leste	31 st (91.0)	133 rd (28)
Cambodia	40 th (88.5)	156 th (21)
Philippines	52 nd (85.3)	85 th (38)

Sources: Fund for Peace (2014) and Transparency International (2014).

Finally, the critical importance of political will in curbing corruption is confirmed by the close linkage between poor governance and rampant corruption in Asian countries. As failed states are "consumed by internal violence and cease delivering positive political goods to their inhabitants," it is not surprising that corruption "thrives on an unusually destructive scale" in these states because there is both widespread "petty or lubricating corruption" and "escalating levels of venal corruption" (Rotberg, 2004, p. 8). Table 5 shows that in 2014 the fragile states of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Myanmar, North Korea, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Timor-Leste, Cambodia and Philippines have extremely high levels of perceived corruption as reflected in their low CPI scores, ranging from 8 for North Korea to 38 for the Philippines and Sri Lanka.

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Learning and Executive Development in Reforming the Singapore Public Service from 1959 to 2001¹

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Abstract

Based on the administrative history of learning and executive development in the Singapore Public Service, this paper argues that training can be employed as a means to introduce reforms into bureaucracies. Evidence from archival records and elite interviews points to the use of training to socialize a colonial-era rent-seeking bureaucracy into a Public Service primed for state-formation. Training was then used to drive reforms, from Singapore's transition into a developmental state to emplacing the bureaucracy into a trajectory of continuous change and relevance in the 21st century. The paper concludes by offering points of reference for bureaucracies aspiring reforms, in particular, the use of training and executive development as a tool for introducing reforms.

Keywords: Singapore Public Service, public administration, bureaucracy, learning and executive development, reforms, administrative history

Introduction

Significance and Scope of Study

Singapore's modernization from a colonial outpost to one of the most successful city-states is typically attributed to the political foresight and will of founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and the People's Action Party (PAP) government (Turnbull, 2009; Drysdale, 1984; Lam & Tan, 1999). Even critics of the Singapore political system acknowledged the central role played by Lee and his PAP colleagues in Singapore's transformation (Worthington, 2003; Trocki, 2006; Bellows, 2009). Yet, the vision of the political *élite* depended on the bureaucracy to be translated into policies, and then implemented as public services impacting upon the citizenry.

Despite its significance, the role played by the Public Service in Singapore's modernization has not been fully explored in literature. Existing literature on the Singapore Public Service concentrates on traditional aspects of the bureaucracy, such as personnel management, anti-corruption, etc., and overlooks the subject of training (Quah, 1996; Quah, 2003; Jones, 2002). There is no dedicated or updated treatment of the subject of training in the Singapore bureaucracy (Sim, 1985; Siow, 1998; Lai, 1995;

Sangiah, 2003). This leads to the question: how did training contribute to the professionalization of the Singapore bureaucracy?


This brief administrative history of training initiatives in the Singapore Public Service draws on archival records and *élite* interviews to address the question.² This study does not dispute the importance of other methodologies but presents administrative history as one approach to expand the field of public administration in Singapore (Raadschelders, 2011, p. 2). Training in this study refers to "the process of developing skills, habits, knowledge and attitudes in the employees for the purpose of increasing the effectiveness of employees in their present government positions, as well as preparing employees for future government positions." (Torpey, 1953, p. 154). The focus on centralized training, where officers from across the Public Service attended common modes of instruction, allows purposeful examination of the subject across the bureaucracy. The study spans from 1959 with Singapore's decolonization to 2001 when the central training school of the bureaucracy was corporatized. The 2001 adjournment also provided a 10-year gap to facilitate access to data informing on the study.

This use of executive development and training, this study asserts, is a means for introducing reforms to professionalize a bureaucracy. The use of training to reform a bureaucracy is neither seen in any other jurisdiction nor featured in public administration literature thus far. Most existing public administration discourse deals with training as a specific topic or routine part of personnel management within the bureaucracy. Two exceptions discussed training in reforms but only as touch-points to topics that were the objectives of the authors (Collins, 1993; Grindle & Hilderbrand, 1995). Fong (1999) did address the use of training to reform the Hong Kong civil service from 1993. But this was 30 years after Singapore started with training-for-reform in 1959 and on a more systematic basis.

Examining the use of training in the professionalization of the Singapore bureaucracy, apart from plugging a gap in current literature, provides lessons for bureaucracies aspiring reforms. Although Singapore's experiences are rooted in its circumstances, some practices could be modified to suit local conditions.

Framework of Analysis

To locate the subject of training in proper perspective, the context of institutional dynamics and evolution of time impacting on training are identified through an analytic framework (Table 1). The three levels of institutional analysis are led by the 'State' providing the over-arching context. It identifies the political *élite* who determined the governance priorities and direction of the bureaucracy. Secondly, the 'Bureaucracy' provides the context within which 'training' is anchored. Finally, a focus on 'Training' is drawn out by the questions of "what, who, when, by whom and where to teach." (Lowe, 2011, p. 314)

Table 1: Institutional & Time Context of Training in the Singapore Bureaucracy

The chronological dimension identified four phases in the development of the Singapore government, beginning with the colonial era (1819 - 1959). The years 1959 to 1969, when Singapore attained self-government and independence, or 'state-formation' conceptualized by Rokkan (Rokkan, 1999, pp. 131-134; Tilly, 1975, p. 65), coincided with the first local training initiative in the Singapore Public Service. The 1970s and 1980s saw Singapore becoming, what Johnson (1982) described as, a 'capitalist developmental state.' Against this background was the advent of a series of training initiatives in the bureaucracy. The 1990s saw Singapore emerging as a developed economy, a period which also witnessed evolutions in the bureaucracy's training institutions culminating in the establishment of the Civil Service College as a statutory board in 2001.


Juxtaposing institutional and chronological contexts, thence, allow for the interrogation of various dynamics influencing the subject of training in each period.

Background

The genesis of the Singapore Public Service, to situate the background for subsequent discussion, lies in the colonial bureaucracy. To keep operating costs low, the British having colonized Singapore in 1819 as a commercial enterprise, the bureaucracy was "the minimum administrative infrastructure necessary for the promotion of economic activities." (Seah, 1971, pp. 4-5). The few civil servants sent out to Singapore had no formal training. An English university education coupled with on-the-job training was thought sufficient to govern the colonies (Blunt, 1937, pp. 35 & 201). For everyday administration, rank-and-file positions such as clerks and policemen were filled by local inhabitants at low salary scales. Even when tertiary education qualified

locals for higher positions over time, their service conditions were kept below those of European colleagues (Seah, 1971, p. 15).

The colonial bureaucracy, long conditioned into a sovereign's agent ruling over imperial subjects, was disconnected with the population. Even local civil servants were overbearing towards the population. Corruption among street-level bureaucrats, sparked off by social-economic dislocation during the Japanese Occupation (1942 - 45) but continuing post-war, worsened public perception of civil servants (Quah, 2010, p. 32). Post-war reforms allowed local officers into executive echelons, including the *élite* Administrative Service heading the Division 1 hierarchy of the bureaucracy (see Table 2). But with a population that was overwhelmingly non-English-speaking, the use of meritocracy in a bureaucracy where English was *lingua franca* perpetuated existing disconnectedness.

Table 2: Personnel Structure of the Singapore Public Service, 1959

Socialization as Training: The Political Study Centre (1959 - 69)

At Singapore's decolonization in 1959, the new locally-elected People's Action Party government, finding a bureaucracy unsuited for nation-building, used training to reform the Public Service. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his ministers were anxious to initiate various development projects and, with Britain still controlling security, secure full independence through merger with Malaya (*Singapore Annual Report (SAR) 1959*, p. 12). Yet, the political masters found a bureaucracy where rank-and-file officers were largely rent-seeking and executives disconnected with the population.³ Civil servants thought the locally-elected PAP government was "pro-communist and ... anti-civil service." (Goh, Oral History, 1993).

Lee Kuan Yew and his government were "exasperated" by their civil servants' lack of "appreciation of the grave challenges before us." (Lee, 1998, p. 319). With the Chinese-speaking majority of the population holding electoral sway, enfranchised by recent decolonization, and the pro-communists eloquent in the Chinese vernacular, the election of a communist regime was highly possible. In the circumstance, Lee and his English-educated ministers had to collaborate with Chinese-educated pro-communist trade unionists to secure the support of the Chinese-speaking electorate. Civil servants, it seemed to Lee and his ministers, had become conditioned to ruling by *fiat* of colonial authority, removed from the need to win the hearts and minds of the local population.

The Political Study Centre and State-Formation

Against this backdrop of terse relationship between the new political masters and the Public Service, the PAP government set up the Political Study Centre (Ministry of Culture, 1959, p. 6). Goh Keng Swee, the Finance Minister whose portfolio included Establishment matters, assessed that civil servants "have not been made aware of the importance of keeping in touch with the masses [because] of past training and background ... in the traditions of the British system." (*Straits Times (ST)*, 29 Jul 1959, p. 14). To reorient the bureaucracy, the Political Study Centre would educate public officers on "the political milieu" in which they would be operating.

The focus of the Political Study Centre was socializing senior officers into an agent of change. Courses were drawn up by PAP ministers; one participant described that classes consisted of:

stimulating lectures, lively Q&A [question and answer], and uninhibited discussions covering the general history of East-West relationship, population changes in Singapore, our economic problems, our problems in nation building, communist tactics both here and in the Federation [of Malaya] with their threats to Malayan nationalism. Theory and practice were equally studied and political institutions were studied against the background of political thought. (Bakti, July 1960, p. 28).

Participants were mostly Administrative Service officers (AOs). This *élite* scheme of service, set up during the colonial era and modeled after the British administrative class, provided the bureaucracy's leadership cadre. These AOs, returning to their posts across various ministries after their stints at the Centre, carried with them that new alignment with the government across the Public Service. The Political Study Centre was thus a catalytic point of change in the Public Service.

No official evaluations of the Political Study Centre are currently available but impressions can be drawn from the recollections of some civil servants. Teo Kah Leong, then-Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of National Development, recalled better understanding of "the background and principles of the communist regimes [and] communism. Many of us in those days were very vague about communism." (Teo,

Oral History, 1993). Most officers acknowledged a clearer appreciation of the political milieu and roles they had to play in the context emerging from stints in the Political Study Centre.

One year on, the Minister for Finance was satisfied that, "senior officers who went through these courses ... understand now why Government policy is what it is." (*Singapore Legislative Assembly Debates*, 12 Dec 1960, section 388). Civil servant Ngiam Tong Dow thought that the Political Study Centre "changed the mindset: you are no longer the masters, now you are the servants of the people." (Ngiam, Interview, 2013).

The establishment of the Political Study Centre can be better appreciated in the context of, what Rokkan called, 'state-formation' (Rokkan, 1999, pp. 131-134; Tilly, 1975, p. 65). Through this framework, the PAP as the emerging *élite* still insecure politically was 'penetrating' its authority over the bureaucracy. Imposing the Political Study Centre, in the words of civil servant Goh Sin Tub, was telling "the Civil Service: 'This shows you who is boss.' " (Goh, Oral History, 1993).

The PAP Split, Merger into Malaysia, and the Role of the Public Service

Meanwhile, the effects of the bureaucracy's socialization played their parts in the evolving political context. The PAP's defeat at a 1961 by-election alarmed the Malayan government to the risk of Singapore, under a weak PAP government, falling to the communists (Turnbull, 2009, pp. 277-278). To forestall the threat to Malaya's security, the Malayan Prime Minister suggested merger of Singapore with Malaya, allowing the Malayan government to proscribe communists within the PAP. This Lee Kuan Yew and his leaders could not attempt without backlash from the Chinese masses. A referendum on merger was unfolding into a battle for survival between PAP leaders and pro-communists. As pro-communists defected *en masse*, the PAP party organization collapsed.

Against this background, the PAP government drew on the Public Service in its campaign for merger. It highlighted its public service accomplishments to ingratiate itself with the electorate: 44,251 public housing units completed to house 20% of the population, 29 schools constructed to increase school enrolments to 397,005, etc. (Ministry of Culture, 1960a, 1960b, 1962).

The referendum saw an overwhelming 71% support for PAP.

By ensuring Singapore's merger with Malaysia, the Public Service helped save the PAP government from certain political collapse. Behind the statistics cited to lend credence to the PAP government's achievements was the handiwork of public officers. They translated the PAP's political visions into detailed plans and then implemented the programmes to better the lives of the population. The work of the Public Service gave the PAP government the evidence of its public service for the citizens, and converted these into votes for the government at the referendum.

In this regard, the Political Study Centre, by socializing and reforming the Public Service to the task of state-formation, delivered its objectives.

Priority of Socialization and State Formation in Independence

Merger with Malaysia was more remarkable for the tumultuous relations between the Federal government and the Singapore State government; changes to administrative structures were nominal (Lau, 1998; Tan, 2008). The conflict between the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) heading the coalition government in Malaysia, and the PAP in Singapore was fundamentally racial: PAP's meritocratic approach to governance challenged UMNO's affirmative action policies aimed at preserving Malay political dominance. As rhetoric fanned tensions, riots complicated the search for a mutually acceptable solution. To avoid further violence, key UMNO and PAP leaders agreed to separate Singapore from Malaysia to its own independence on 9 Aug 1965.

The suddenness of Singapore's independence surprised its own Public Service, though civil servants were now attuned to its operating context (Lee, 1998, p. 631). Although the Malaysian government separated Singapore from the Federation, radicals in Malaysia threatened to abrogate Singapore's independence (Lee, 2000, p. 22). A state of war remained with Indonesia. "Fortuitously", Chan observed, Singapore's public officers by this time, having undergone "reorientation and retraining [at the Political Study Centre] shared the same ideology as the ruling leadership and was sensitive to its political tasks." (Chan, 1991, p. 162).

Training to Lead Change in a Developmental State (1970s - 1980s)

In 1971, the Staff Training Institute (STI) was set up for the Singapore Public Service to keep pace with the emerging developmental state. The closure of the Political Study Centre in 1969, after the government assessed that most senior civil servants had attended its courses, meant that training had become largely on-the-job; within two years, "more than 50 per cent of the officers are relatively new and *untrained*." (ST, 16 Mar 1971, p. 17).

More importantly, public officers needed the skills to rise up as the 'economic general staff' to manage, what Johnson called, a developmental state (Johnson, 1982, p. 559; Johnson, 1999, p. 40; Wade, 1990, pp. 25-27; Low, 2001, p. 416). The PAP's determination to make Singapore succeed and thrive "created a demand for properly trained civil servants with experience and knowledge of modern management techniques." (Bogaars, 1973, p. 83).

The STI was the government's response to build up an 'economic general staff' within the Administrative Service to keep pace with the developmental state (Staff Training Institute (STI), 1973, Appendix B3; *Management Development (MD)*, Jun 1975, p. 9). Modern facilities saw a name change to the Civil Service Staff Development Institute (CSSDI) but it was a continuation of the existing set-up (*Government Directory (Govt Directory) 1977*, p. 139; *Establishment List 1976*, p. 2).

In 1979, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew called a meeting that reiterated the use of training for reform. Unhappy that the verbose language of memoranda was slowing down "the process of government," the Prime Minister responded to a reference to CSSDI: "Can't we find a better name for CSSDI. Find a word that conveys the meaning instead of an acronym which does not convey any." (MD, Jun 1979, p. 3). Overnight, the Civil Service Staff Development Institute became the Civil Service Institute (CSI) (Vij, Interview, 2013). But its objectives, structure and activities remained the same (*Training Directory*, 1980, p. 1).

To improve communication across the bureaucracy, the CSI was instructed to intensify its language courses. Following the first programme for Administrative Service officers "to learn simple, clear and precise styles of writing" (ST, 12 Jul 1979, p. 8), similar courses were rolled out for officers down the hierarchy.

In retrospect, these efforts to improve language helped professionalize the Public Service. Communication may be taken for granted in the bureaucracies of homogenous societies such as Britain, China or France. But in Singapore, where the mother tongues of the majority of the population are not English, poor communication was apparently inhibiting command and control to require the Prime Minister's personal intervention. Looking back, a senior CSI staff assessed this as "another important accomplishment that is often forgotten, that communication up and down the ranks, if it's clear, concise, crisp... I think that's an important aspect." (Ewing-Chow, Interview, 2011).

Institutionalization of a Tool of Change: Civil Service Institute

Meanwhile, the evolving context saw the CSI becoming the focal point through which change was introduced into the bureaucracy. In response to the 1979 global recession, the PAP government, empowered by a 78% electoral landslide, restructured the economy towards high-value products. To raise labour productivity, a national committee concluded that "the public sector in Singapore should set an example in improving productivity, work attitudes and human management" (SAR 1983, p. 41).

The CSI was tasked to operationalize the productivity movement by starting-up Work Improvement Teams (WITs) to enhance efficiency in daily work (SAR 1986, p. 44). For a quick multiplier effect, CSI would train up WITs leaders who would return to their ministries to train more WITs leaders (ST, 9 Aug 1982, p. 13). By 1989, 76,000 officers or 45% of the Public Service were involved in WITs. This introduction of the productivity movement into the Public Service catalyzed its subsequent propagation into the national economy.

By the 1980s, the CSI had evolved into an established training institution, including for rank-and-file officers. Whether there were any formal evaluation of the CSI's training activities and impact on civil servants cannot be ascertained at this juncture; no records of these were discovered in the course of this research. John Ewing-Chow, Director/CSI (1981 - 85), however, "viewed the whole Public Service as

my boss and CSI and I responded to requests that had national and public service wide impact." (Ewing-Chow, Interview, 2011). This continued under the directorship of David Ma (1986 - 89) and Ms Teo Hee Lian (1989 - 96) (Ma, Interview, 2013; Teo, Interview, 2012).

But the CSI's trajectory of development was pulling it away from the government's longstanding focus on cultivating the Administrative Service *élite*. Although CSI continued to prioritize the training of the AOs, in the eyes of many among its audience, CSI's courses were poor cousins to post-graduate courses at prestigious overseas universities (Tan, Interview, 2013; Sim, 1985, p. 41). The CSI's drive to spearhead productivity across the bureaucracy was regarded by some Public Service leaders as 'miscellaneous' (Ewing-Chow, Interview, 2011). In trying to be the training centre for the whole Public Service, CSI was increasingly seen as a school for the *hoi polloi* and not befitting the AOs.

Training as a Tool for Reforms (1991 - 2001)

A New Political Context: Socialization Revisited

In 1993, a new Civil Service College (CSC) was set up specifically to develop the Administrative Service officers. Kishore Mahbubani, the first Dean of the CSC, explained that, "Civil Service College was always intended for the highest levels of the Service, for the AOs, for the high flyers, to train them, develop them, socialise them." (Mahbubani, Interview, 2012).

Above all, CSC sought to cultivate an ethos among the Public Service leadership. George Yeo, then-Minister of State for Finance, was "most convinced of the need for the CSC" (Yeo, email, 21 Jun 2012) to cultivate within AOs a "collective self-consciousness of its role in society.... concerned with the national welfare and proud to be charged with that responsibility." (Yeo, 1988). Looming large was the political context against which CSC was set up.

The People's Action Party entered into the 1990s after a decade of electoral dips. In 1981 its absolute monopoly of the Parliament ended when it lost a by-election; its share of popular votes fell by 12.6% to 62.9% in the 1984 General Elections, and further to 61.8% in the 1988 polls (SAR 1985, p. 66). The popularity of Goh Chok Tong, who succeeded Lee Kuan Yew as Prime Minister in 1990, appeared able to turn the PAP's electoral tide (Singh, 1992, pp. 32-34; Mutalib, 1992, pp. 71-72). But the 1991 polls saw the PAP in its worst ever electoral outing: the loss of four Parliament-seats and an all-time low of 61% of the vote.

At around this time, Singapore became the subject of a discourse on development's causality relationship towards democratization. Political liberalization in Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) in the 1980s, from Korea to Taiwan, renewed interest in the thesis that social mobility on the backs of economic development was raising a

more participative middle class (Hewison, Rodan & Robinson, 1993, p. 2). Questions arose on whether similar democratization would emerge in other NICs, including Singapore (Rodan, 1993, p. 52).

The PAP directed some of its post-electoral soul-searching at the bureaucracy. Deputy Prime Minister Ong Teng Cheong urged civil servants to be "politically astute":

even the most well-meaning policy can end up a disaster if the Government bureaucracy shows no political sensitivity in implementing it.... When the PAP took office in 1959, one of the first things it did was to set up the Political Study Centre.... Perhaps the proposed Civil Service College is a good place for the government to inculcate greater political sensitivity amongst younger civil servants. (Ong, 1992, p. 18).

The reference to the Political Study Centre draws comparison with the political milieu following self-government: new political *élite* consolidating their authority amidst a bureaucracy disconnected with the population. Like their predecessors, the PAP leaders in the 1990s turned to the 'political education' of the Administrative Service leadership, a role envisioned for the Civil Service College.

The Civil Service College drew up a set of programmes to develop the Administrative Service corps at various critical points, or milestones, in the careers of these officers. These milestone programmes were the Foundation Course to induct new AOs, the Senior Management Programme for mid-career heads of departments, and the Leadership in Administration Programme for senior officers rising to the apex of the Public Service hierarchy.

A sampling of feedback from participants suggested that the aim of setting up the CSC, to cultivate a sense of shared ethos among the AO leadership cadre, was largely effective. A young AO, writing after attending the Foundation Course, reflected that she learnt the importance of teamwork and clear communication through the programme (*Ethos*, 1995, No. 1, p. 8). Another account of the Leaders in Administration Programme found in *Ethos*, the journal of the CSC, reported that:

Feedback from the participants showed that once again, experiential learning and sharing of ideas in group discussions are useful learning tools. Although the issues discussed might not be new, the time put aside for deliberation and debate amongst the participants have made this experience a beneficial one for both the participants and CSC. (Ethos, 1995, No. 3, p. 12).

PS21 and Aligning Training for Reforms

In 1995, the launch of the Public Service for the 21st Century (PS21) movement saw training being used as agent of change. PS21, "the most comprehensive administrative reform to be introduced in Singapore," (Quah, 2010, p. 147) coincided with the wave of New Public Management (NPM) ideas in the 1990s. The

corporatization of numerous public service functions, granting high degree of discretionary powers to executives of these autonomous agencies and introduction of market competition and performance indicators to improve efficiency of public services were conceptually similar to NPM.⁴ But Lim Siong Guan, Permanent Secretary (Prime Minister's Office), distinguished PS21 by its quest for 'excellence':

The whole impetus for PS21 has nothing to do with the idea of 'small government'.... [PS21] is this whole concept of 'excellence' - and 'excellence' is being the best that you can be, it's a never ending journey, being the best that you can be - which to me is a different paradigm than just 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness'. (Lim, Interview, 2013).

Training was recognized as a means to improve the quality of public services. Lim explained that, sandwiched between rising demands from the public and pressures from "bosses" to improve the organization of the public service, "The way to develop [the civil servant's] muscles was to build up his competency, build up his skills-level." (Lim, Interview, 2013). A target was set to deliver 12.5 days of training per year for each employee by the year 2000. This '100 hours' target was a five-fold increase in the commitment towards training, until then averaging 2.8 days (*ST*, 28 Feb 1996, p. 23).

Training across the Public Service was reviewed as part of the PS21 reforms. In 1995, Ms Lim Soo Hoon was posted into CSC and appointed as Dean: "Mr. Lim [Siong Guan] said he wanted to consolidate training. He gave me the task of merging the old CSI with the new animal called CSC." (Lim Soo Hoon, Interview, 2012)⁵.

The CSI was soon renamed the Institute of Public Administration and Management (IPAM), the leadership centre became the Institute of Policy Development and both consolidated under a new Civil Service College (*Govt Directory 1996*, pp. 683-695; *Training Directory 1997/98*, p. iii). David Ma returned as Director of IPAM and, significantly, was concurrently Head of the PS21 Office at the Public Service Division: "Mr. Lim [Siong Guan] said, 'Since we needed to make training to support PS21', I was put in.... The whole idea was to support PS21." (Ma, Interview, 2013).

Among IPAM's adjustments to support PS21 was a Training Framework that mirrored the PS21 Training Initiative. Each of the five career stages consisted of "five groups of generic competence: Managing service excellence, Managing change, Managing/working with people, Managing operations and resources, Managing self." (*Training Directory, 1997 - 1998*, p. iv).

Within a year IPAM increased its course-offerings by 17% to 177 courses, training 20,000 officers or one-third of all civil servants (*Training Programme 1996/97; Training Directory, 1997 - 1998*, p. i; *Budget for the Financial Year 1998/99 (Budget 1998/99)*, p. 64). By 1999, it ran 458 courses to train 92,000 officers, technically reaching out to all 67,795 civil servants, with some returning as repeated customers (*Training Directory, 2000*, p. ii; *Budget FY2000-2001*, p. 65). Training Officer, Ms

Ngiam Su Wei, remembered "introducing many different training programmes [to meet the PS21 target of] 100 training hours." (Ngiam Su Wei, Interview, 2013) PS21 reforms was the *raison d'être* for the rapid expansion in IPAM's capacity to provide training across the Public Service.

Injecting Competition

To maintain the quality of IPAM's programmes amidst the quantitative growth, David Ma placed IPAM on Inter-Departmental Charging (IDC) model (Ma, Interview, 2013). This transferred the government's training budget, until then allocated by the Ministry of Finance to IPAM, to the ministries. Should ministries not subscribe to IPAM's programmes, IPAM could become obsolescent.

The timing couldn't be worst: currency crises across Southeast Asia dampened the 1997 economic outlook. Measures by the PAP government, empowered by 64% popular vote at elections that year, allowed Singapore 7.8% economic growth (Daniel, 1998, pp. 2-6).

For IPAM, government agencies' subscription to its programmes did not dip. On reflection, IPAM officer Ms Ngiam Su Wei thought: "IDC was one way to ensure that we offer quality training programmes to the Public Service." (Ngiam Su Wei, Interview, 2013).

In 1998, Permanent Secretary Lim Siong Guan assigned Yam Ah Mee, his new Deputy Secretary and concurrently Dean/Civil Service College, the task of scaling up competition across CSC. David Ma observed that, "with Inter Departmental Charging, we were still a government department. ... we would still go back to our bosses and say, 'We have no money, help us.' " (Ma, Interview, 2013). Cutting CSC adrift from the Public Service Division's funding to compel high quality relevant training for the bureaucracy, in contrast, would remove any last resort to the Civil Service for help. CSC would have to finance itself from the courses it would sell. But CSC would have flexibility to recruit staff at competitive market conditions without the strictures of civil service regulations.

As a self-financing statutory board, Yam Ah Mee needed to raise a \$10.8 million initial operating capital. But the economic outlook was complicating his pitch to bankers: the 2001 GDP was contracting 2.2% following the 9/11 attacks on the United States (Baharudin, 2002, p. 2). Yam "had to show the bank This is the strategy. I had to give them a value proposition. So the bank supported us, I signed this." (Yam, Interview, 2011). The decision weighed heavily on him: "This was the first time I borrowed \$10.8 million and I knew that in 6½ months, about seven months, it would run dry, unless we did well. I really didn't sleep well."

CSC as a Statutory Board

On 1 Oct 2001, CSC formally became a self-financing statutory board under the

purview of the Public Service Division in the Prime Minister's Office (ST, 10 Oct 2001, p. H10). The Institute of Policy Development remained focused on the development of the Administrative Service and leadership corps of the Public Service; IPAM continued to cover public administration and PS21 initiatives.

The quest for financial viability led Yam Ah Mee, as Dean/CEO, to recruit private sector expertise to instill competition and fiscal discipline (Yam, Interview, 2011). A tight feedback loop allowed him to evaluate and make quick decisions on the fly.

Operating at such high intensity was exacting. Ngiam Su Wei, by now an IPAM manager, remembered a number of staff left because "it no longer resonated with them." (Ngiam Su Wei, Interview, 2013). Yam received "many nasty letters [some going to] Mr. Lim Siong Guan [Head of Civil Service], went to Mr. Eddie Teo [Permanent Secretary, PSD], went even beyond that." (Yam, Interview, 2011). Fortunately for Yam, the leadership was prepared to hear him out: "I had to explain to Mr. Lim Siong Guan, Eddie Teo, many people: we were doing the right thing, it's moving well." Yam and CSC were allowed to continue.

Taking Stock

Evaluating public sector organizations is difficult - the complexity involved in quantifying public service meant that what cannot be measured cannot be evaluated. Perhaps one approach is to assess CSC against the objective it set for itself.

When CSC transitioned into a statutory board, it aimed to provide high quality training relevant to the Public Service. In that regard, the financial results validated the relevance to the bureaucracy, as Yam Ah Mee recalled:

the total revenue brought in was \$43 million [Financial Year 2002]. In fact, for the three years, it was about \$43 million [FY2002], \$39 million [FY2003], \$43 million [FY2004]. Beyond expectations.

The reason was that while we reached to the usual ministries, although they did lesser, we did more, we did local and overseas. And then I found that subsequent second year, they all came back. Because after they tried outside, then they said that outside not so customized, may not be so good. And the first year we had a net surplus of a couple of millions. (Yam, Interview, 2013).

Yam's greatest relief was that, "within the first year I returned to DBS [Bank] \$10.8 million." With remuneration pegged to financial outcomes, CSC staff were also "rewarded for all the hardwork." (Ngiam Su Wei, Interview, 2013).

One dimension worth evaluating is the 'cost' upon its staff. Officers were fatigued by the ramping up of programmes and preoccupation with targets, but this might be inevitable in order to 'unlock' the full potential of the organization, as one departmental head mused:

if you look at it from another point of view, you might wonder how much spare capacity we had been harbouring in the old set-up.... The moment you turned it the other way around and say, 'I'm going to pay you based on performance, I'm going to pay you based on whether you meet your KPIs, the more you earn, the more bonus you get.' Straight away, human behavior changes and you can unleash, almost doubling. It's quite a good illustration of how market forces can unleash all these sleepy government performance. (Roger Tan, Interview, 2013).

Several managers with longer stints concurred. M. Logendran pointed out that, "Survival was the word! sometimes you have to do some things which were not pleasant at the time, but it was the right thing to do." (Logendran, Interview, 2013). All other CSC officers interviewed for this study felt that the focus on survivability at that time was necessary, despite the strain on staff, and laid the foundation for today's Civil Service College (Ngiam Su Wei, Interview, 2013; Tina Tan, Interview, 2013; Wong, Interview, 2013).


In retrospect, the advent of New Public Management re-shaped learning and executive development in the Singapore Public Service in the 1990s. Mandating each civil servant to undergo a specific 100-hours of annual training, injecting mechanisms such as Inter-Departmental Charging and finally turning the Civil Service College into a self-financing statutory board were NPM in action: performance indicators, market-based competition and corporatization. New Public Management ideas transformed the approach towards training and development in the Singapore Public Service in the 1990s.

Conclusion

The objective of this study, as set out at the beginning of this paper, is to present the use of training and executive development by the Singapore Public Service to introduce reforms to keep it relevant. The analytic framework anchors the study in the institutional context of the state and bureaucracy, as it traverses through the periods in Singapore's development. At self-government, the new locally-elected political leadership at the state-level, contemplating an ineffectual Public Service inherited from the colonial era at the bureaucracy-level, imposed the Political Study Centre - in the guise of training - to reorient civil servants towards the task of state-formation. In the 1970s and 1980s, the setting up of the Staff Training Institute and Civil Service Institute could be traced to the need to inject changes into the bureaucracy, in order to meet the needs of the Singapore developmental state. Finally, the PS21 initiative harnessed executive development and training as a catalyst to introduce reforms across the Singapore bureaucracy, keeping the Public Service relevant to the Singapore state. Throughout this period of over 40 years, executive development and training have been the means through which reforms were introduced into the Singapore Public Service.

The defining features of the Singapore model underscore the contribution of executive development and training upon the Singapore bureaucracy. Key among these was the importance of strong political support to finance the bureaucracy's training and reforms agenda. Secondly, an economy-first imperative generated the resources to fund the bureaucracy's programmes. The fruits of prioritizing economic development, while taking some time to materialize, provided the wherewithal for the bureaucracy to develop, grow its training initiatives and pursue reforms. At the same time, social development financed from an economy-first imperative also availed higher capacity human capital to staff the Public Service. This allows the Public Service to concentrate on high-level policy design and formulation, skill up rank-and-file vocations thereby providing them with career mobility, and reduce the number of unskilled positions in the bureaucracy. The personnel structure of today's Public Service is a reverse of the pyramidal small elite presiding over a large rank-and-file base inherited from the colonial bureaucracy (see Table 3).

Table 3: Personnel Structure of the Singapore Public Service, 2013



This study is not prescribing a template for replication in other jurisdictions, but offers some features for reference. Singapore's context in the use of training to reform its Public Service is exceptional - small physical size aiding governance, one-party rule providing political continuity, etc. But aspects in this approach can be decontextualized.

Consistently strong political support is necessary for any initiative to take off in the bureaucracy. Yet, training and reforms improve the bureaucracy's capacity to deliver public services which, in ingratiating the government of the day with the electorate, can be persuasive arguments to garner support from political masters.

A strong fiscal position, arising from steady economic growth over the years, provided the fiscal wherewithal to drive and sustain the training-for-reforms initiative in the Singapore Public Service. The reality, hence, is the necessity of an economy-first imperative to accrue sufficient resources to finance developmental projects.

Raising standards of living often stands out as obvious priorities, but improving the bureaucracy has the consequential advantage of injecting efficiency in social reforms. Social development, by enhancing healthcare and education, does contribute towards reforming the civil service since its personnel are drawn from the population. But, focusing solely on social development and neglecting the bureaucracy risks undoing any progress in development. The key is drawing up a fine balance between investing in social development, and executive training to reform the bureaucracy.

This study is designed as a touchstone for further research. The 10-year distance from the scope of study, having worked well indeed to desensitize the sources and ease access to information, immediately presented areas for follow-up study. The Civil Service College underwent numerous changes since 2001, including several leadership successions. More significantly, changes in the operating milieu of the Public Service after the 2011 general election required the CSC to adjust itself in relation to the bureaucracy. Even as heightened citizen expectation and the social media constrict the time and space for policy responses to increasingly complex issues - such as ageing population, healthcare financing, remaining economically competitive, trans-national terrorism, just to name a few - the government is compelled to set aside attention to engage with the citizenry. How the Civil Service College will respond to the changes expected from the Public Service in this newly emerging operating milieu should be the focus of a serious update to this administrative history or even a dedicated study.

Laid against the broader field of the academic discipline, this study poses some questions for further reflection and research on the role of training and executive development in public administration. By contextualizing the evolution of the Singapore Public Service against the country's development, can Singapore's transformation be completely dependent upon the political leadership? By tracing the impact of training institutions upon the bureaucracy, does training not have a broader scope in public administration beyond the current bounds of personnel management? Can training be designed with a more significant role in nation-building strategies for developing countries? There is indeed much scope for future research to follow on from this study.

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Notes

1. This article is an adaptation of the author's PhD thesis, which is a detailed administrative history of training and executive development in reforming the Singapore Public Service.
2. The term "Public Service" encompasses statutory boards structured outside of ministries which made up the civil service (*Constitution*, 1980, Article 102).
3. Policemen were accepting \$10 to overlook traffic offences; a driver's licence could be guaranteed for \$100 (Yap, Lim & Leong, 2010, p. 175; Cheong, 2012, p. 296).
4. Haque found that 102 government departments and units had been converted into autonomous agencies by 1997. Haque, 2009, p. 255.
5. Lim Soo Hoon is not related to Lim Siong Guan.

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Negotiating the Minimum Wage Level in Hong Kong's Business-driven Regime: A Neopluralist Perspective

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Abstract

Hong Kong has long been recognized as a business-driven regime while policies providing strong labour protection have certainly been rejected by the business elites. However, the statutory minimum wage which had been negotiated for more than a decade was successfully legislated in 2010. Why does this unusual practice exist in Hong Kong? This paper argues that the minimum wage policy in Hong Kong which is supposed to be a labour-friendly policy has turned out to be a pro-business one from the perspective of neopluralism. Although open platforms were available for all stakeholders, the government had its own policy preferences whereas the business sector enjoyed a privileged position in the policy making process. This case is significant in the sense that only a few labour policies can be legislated in Hong Kong and, more importantly, the government was strongly criticized for giving special privileges to the business sector, causing confrontational state-union relations.

Keywords: minimum wage, labour policy, business-driven regime, neopluralism, Hong Kong

Introduction

Within any particular country or region, government, unions and employers adopt different approaches towards statutory minimum wage regulation, reflecting diverse objectives and competing interests (Grimshaw, 2013). On the one hand, the business sector generally fights to keep the minimum wage level as low as possible so as to reduce the operation cost. On the other hand, the labour side demands setting the highest wage level for the sake of maximizing their protection. The policy outcome depends on the government attitude towards different stakeholders, ranging from pro-business to pro-labour sides. Hence, "the politics of minimum wage", according to Waltman (2000), is usually a controversial issue in every society because it inevitably touches on various interests between stakeholders, including unions, employers, government, political parties and grassroots associations.

Indeed, public policy making is always considered a political process with compromises, conflicts and struggles among stakeholders with confrontational interests

(Anderson, 2006). Theoretically, policy makers need to strike a balance and, more importantly, reach a consensus among different groups. Thus, Dye (2008) asserts that politics is "the struggle among groups to influence public policy (p.21)" because political power is supposed to be distributed among various stakeholders and, in the meantime, everyone holds an opportunity to participate in the policy making process (Heywood, 2013). However, Smith (1995) suggests that although political power is widely dispersed in three main sectors, namely the government, business sector and civil society, the distribution may not be ideally equal. Many factors such as wealth, social status, professional qualification and personal network with policy makers result in unequal power distribution.

In particular, Hong Kong is a semi-democratic, business-driven and centralized regime while the business sector enjoys a privileged position in policy making. In other words, the power distribution is not equally distributed in society but mainly concentrated in a few business elites. Then, how do these business elites respond to the challenges arising from the minimum wage legislation which is supposed to be a pro-labour policy? The issue of the minimum wage is highly controversial among local politicians, the business sector, media and general public, which had been negotiated for more than a decade. Subsequent to a series of bargaining, Donald Tsang, the second Chief Executive, announced on 16 July 2010 the establishment of a minimum wage in Hong Kong and began the wage level at \$28 per hour on 1 May 2011 (Labour Department, 2011). The minimum wage seems to be a pro-labour policy which concerns labour protection; however, in Hong Kong's situation, the business interests are clearly reflected. This paper argues that the business sector dominated the statutory minimum wage policy making by adopting a neopluralist framework.

Features of Classical Pluralism and Neopluralism

According to Michael Hill (2005, p.13), how public policy is formulated and implemented is largely determined by the power structure of society. Indeed, the power structure, also named "nature of state power" by Hill, is affected by both state and societal factors. In general, there are mainly five theories explaining power structures, namely classical pluralism, neopluralism, elitism, corporatism and Marxism, each of which provides a theoretical perspective to analyze the policy making process (Ham & Hill, 1993). This paper focuses on classical pluralism and neopluralism because of the consideration of the political features of Hong Kong.

Classical Pluralism

Pluralism attempts to examine that society is diverse which implies no single group or class can dominate policy making (Smith, 1995). In other words, political power is non-cumulative and dispersed. In the past few decades, pluralism has been further advanced and improved by political scientists. According to Dahl and Lindblom (1953), policy making is operated under the principle of "rule by many" and an open platform is set up for all individuals and groups to bargain with the policy development and this

process is termed as "polyarchy". Moreover, Dahl (1989) further elaborates on this concept and suggests that all groups representing various individuals hold equal rights to influence the policy bargaining process whereas no single group is dominant regardless of its economic and political privileges.

Apart from group dynamics, more importantly, the government is responsible for regulating conflicts in society and remaining neutral in the policy process. Indeed, Schwarzmantel (1994) argues that government is the servant but not the master of the citizens and Dye (2008) summarizes the functions of government under pluralism: (1) setting up rules of the game for group struggle, (2) arranging compromises and balancing interests, (3) enacting compromises in the form of policy, and (4) enforcing these compromises.

Neopluralism

Classical pluralism, in theory, is regarded as the best form of government because it is probably consistent with the principles of modern democracy, implying equal power among groups and individuals (Smith, 1995). But, in reality, it faces a series of criticisms. Hirst (1990) claims that the perspective of Dahl is too ideal because it is impossible to include all groups and individuals in policy making. Factually, many groups and citizens are excluded because of lack of wealth, social status, as well as political resources (Hirst, 1990). It is under this circumstance that classical pluralism has been revised to neopluralism.

Basically, neopluralism is a theory which comes from pluralist values. Unlike the classical one, it takes due account of the privileged position of the business sector whereas the government is the political actor which pursues its own policy preferences (Heywood, 2013). As a consequence, the distribution of political power is unequal although it is widely dispersed in society (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953). Furthermore, Dahl (1985) applies the term, "deformed polyarchy", to conceptualize the inequality of ownership of economic resources which leads to the concentration of political power in the hands of a few business elites rather than the masses.

This imbalance of political power is rooted in the role of the business sector as it is able to control the employment rate and amount of investment which are the primary concern of government and crucial for politicians to gain popular support. Lindblom (1977) suggests that the business sector is advantaged by two important factors:

- Government is dependent on a successful economy and so has a tendency to provide inducements and advantages to business. The requirements to meet the needs of business mean that it achieves "a privileged position in government" (Lindblom, 1977, p.175).
- In a market economy, many decisions are taken by business concerning investment and employment. Despite the impact that these decisions have on people's lives, they are not subject to democratic control (Lindblom, 1977, p.172).

Against these drawbacks, the business sector is able to take advantages from the government and get privileges in the bargaining process (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993). In this sense, neopluralism asserts that the government has its own sectional interests for offering a better status to the business sector. As a consequence, it can be considered an interest group or political actor who has its own agenda, instead of being "neutral" (Heywood, 2013). To sum up, although neopluralism emphasizes widely dispersed political power, it is unevenly distributed due to the business domination and government's policy preference.

Changing Power Distribution in Hong Kong

The political power in colonial Hong Kong was highly concentrated on the executive authorities headed by the British Governor. Under this power structure, policies were formulated at the top of the bureaucracy and were implemented at the base of the organization. Until the 1980s, no other institution or organization had the capacity to challenge the authority of bureaucracy and therefore top government officials dominated the formulation and implementation of policies (Scott, 2005). This mode of dominant political power could be termed by various political scientists as an "administrative state" (Harris, 1978), "bureaucratic polity" (Lau, 1982) or "government by bureaucrats" (Cheung, 1998).

Apart from concentrating the major political power in the bureaucracy, Hong Kong politics and power structure in the colonial era were also characterized by the engagement of small groups of elites from the business community and Chinese society. In the early 1980s, the colonial administration had built up consultative bodies in an attempt to incorporate the local elites and involve their views in the formulation of policies (Scott, 2005, p. 204). Then, King (2003) summarized this strategy of incorporation as "administrative absorption of politics" (p.90). By combining the interests with local elites, the colonial government successfully achieved a high level of elite integration and constructed the "elite-consensual polity". Those co-opted elites were taking on behalf of the social and business associations, representing the stances and opinions among its members (Tsang, 1997). By integrating them into the governmental process, it guaranteed the policy gained the support from the elite classes and strengthened the legitimacy of the British colonial government in Hong Kong (Miners, 2001). To a large extent, the power structure of colonial Hong Kong reflected a certain feature of elitism, because the bureaucracy with a small number of elites almost monopolized all functions in the polity while the society was generally excluded.

The political structure of elitism over the policy making process lasted for over a century until the early 1980s. The development of civil society and subordination of the legislature to the executive incrementally reformed the centralized bureaucratic polity. The rise of civil society and political activism in the 1980s was triggered by the controversies regarding the change of sovereignty over Hong Kong. The political debates on the future of post-colonial Hong Kong had induced public participation in

politics, leading to the rise of political parties and local politicians (Ma, 2007). This wave of civil society activism further intensified in 1997. Since the handover, the political slogan of "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong" inspired the public demand towards the better performance of the post-colonial government. However, the increasing public expectations towards the Tung Chee-hwa administration, the first Chief Executive, coincided with prolonged economic depression and a series of policy failures (Chan & Chan, 2007). Therefore, public dissatisfaction with the performance of Tung gradually mounted in society.

The Tung administration faced the most serious political crisis on 1 July 2003 when more than half a million Hong Kong people joined a mass protest against the controversial Basic Law Article 23 legislation. In 2004, another large-scale movement was organized when hundreds of thousands of people marched again to fight for universal suffrage for the Chief Executive and all members in the Legislative Council (Ma, 2007). Furthermore, Chan and Chan (2007) discovered the two July 1 demonstrations in 2003 and 2004 highlighted the milestone of further growth of active civil society and development of mass politics. After these two important protests, the sense of belonging to Hong Kong became stronger. Residents believed that they were the masters of Hong Kong and confident to form different associations and become involved in a series of policy campaigns like "protection of Victoria Harbour" and "protection of the Star Ferry Pier campaign" to fight for their interests. With the emergence of civil society and rising demand for public participation in public affairs, the myth of administrative elites' unchallenged authority has gradually diminished and they have become increasingly subject to public opinion and the influence of different social groups (Scott, 2005).

However, the state and business alliance still remained in power. One fundamental change was in the pattern of business representation. Local Chinese capitalists replaced the dominant British ones and continued to maintain their vested interests (So, 2000). Yep (2009) argued that the expansion of business power was not only in the advisory bodies as mentioned by Cheung and Wong (2004) and Goodstadt (2005), but also in the governing machineries like the Legislative Council and Chief Executive Election Committee. From 1997 to 2012, half of the seats in the Legislative Council were dominated by "functional constituencies" which largely represented the major business and professional groups (SynergyNet, 2010). The Chief Executive Election Committee was also dominated by the business and professional interests, whereas each of them held 25 percent of the whole members respectively. Thus, So (2000) emphasized that although the business representatives were changing from British to Chinese big businessmen, the nature of the power structure remained unchanged. As the business sector has long been regarded as protecting Hong Kong's capitalist system and containing the wave of democratization, the Beijing and Hong Kong government intentionally formed the "Chinese-centered state-business alliance", allowing Beijing to secure a reliable coalition partner in Hong Kong (So, 2000). Hence, the business sector still holds the dominant position in policy making and this is in line with the

explanation of neopluralism.

Disputes over the Statutory Minimum Wage in Hong Kong

Hong Kong has long been business-driven while policies for strong labour regulations have been rejected by the business and government elites. Under the philosophy of "positive non-intervention", the minimum wage legislation has long been a controversial topic and debated for more than a decade (Apple Daily, 2010a).

In the early stage of the handover, the pro-labour parties found that it was difficult to attract public attention to the wage issues because, at that time, the unemployment rate remained low at 2.2% and Tung Chee-hwa promised to improve welfare delivery instead of any legislation (Ho, 2010). In late 1997, when the Asian financial crisis broke out in Hong Kong, the unemployment rate rapidly increased to 6.2% in 1999. In response, Lee Cheuk-yan, a legislator from Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (HKCTU), introduced the issue of the minimum wage legislation for discussion in the Legislative Council in April 1999. However, with strong opposition from the business sector, this issue only lasted for a short period of time (Hong, Ip, Chan, & Lee, 2001). In 2000, Lee Cheuk-yan re-initiated a similar motion again. But, without the consensus of the Legislative Council, the government was under no pressure to reject the proposal for a minimum wage. In 2001, the media reported that an aged 68 outsourced cleansing worker had to work for more than 14 hours per day in a public toilet and earned only \$7 per hour (Metrohk, 2010), sparking off public criticisms of the poor pay for the government's outsourced services. Again, the pro-labour legislators advocated the setting of a minimum wage to improve protection but this was finally rejected by the government. In 2004, Oxfam Hong Kong and HKCTU cooperatively urged some government departments to disclose the pay level of outsourced workers. It was under this circumstance that the Chief Executive made a concession by announcing the adoption of the "average market wage" for all government outsourced workers (HKCTU, 2006; Wenweipo, 2004).

In 2006, the government took more actions to improve and examine the under-paid condition in Hong Kong. For the sake of gaining public support during the Chief Executive Election Campaign, Donald Tsang, the second Chief Executive, promised to study the minimum wage policy and suggested the future policy would be extended to cover all outsourced services in public bodies and government departments. After Tsang won the election, both pro-labour parties and associations urged him to commit to the minimum wage legislation. In the Legislative Council, Lee Cheuk-yan urged the Chief Executive to immediately legislate whereas the legislators from the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (HKFTU), another pro-labour party, bargained for a timetable. However, also with the strong opposition from the business sector, the government only committed to promoting a two-year voluntary scheme entitled the "Wage Protection Movement" for experimental purposes (The Sun, 2007). This scheme invited private enterprises to protect cleaning workers and security guards and pay

average market rates (Labour Department, 2007). Overall, only 21.6% of targeted workers came under the protection of this voluntary scheme. As a result, the Labour and Welfare Bureau announced the failure of this campaign and planned for the comprehensive legislation of a minimum wage. At the same time, Oxfam Hong Kong and the media successfully drew public attention to the plight of "working poverty", speeding up the legislation process. In the policy address of 2008, Donald Tsang announced the establishment of the Provisional Minimum Wage Commission (PMWC) which was responsible for advising him on the initial statutory minimum wage level. Then, the battlefield between business and unions shifted to the debate on the "reasonable pay level".

The employer side, generally speaking, demanded setting the initial wage level from \$22 to \$26. The Liberal Party, a representative of the pro-business party, proposed that the minimum wage should be set at \$24 in order to minimize the influence on the competitiveness of Hong Kong (Hong Kong Economic Times, 2009). The Chinese Manufacturers' Associations of Hong Kong, one of the leading business associations, proposed wage level should be set at \$22 to \$24. They worried that if the wage level was set higher than \$24, then it might result in "huge unemployment" (Hong Kong Economic Times, 2010). Some enterprises even warned that they would have to cut manpower and transfer the extra cost to customers (Singtao Daily, 2010).

As for the labour side, in general, it strived for a minimum wage rate between \$30 and \$35. Lee Cheuk-yan advocated that the initial minimum wage level should be set at \$33 while the government needed to put the protection of families' living standards as the first consideration (Ming Pao, 2009a). The Hong Kong Catholic Commission for Labour Affairs, a pro-labour religious association, also urged to set the initial minimum wage at \$33 per hour so as to maintain family expenditure and fight against inflation (Hong Kong Daily News, 2009). In the pro-Beijing camp, Ip Wai-ming, the legislator of HKFTU, emphasized that the maintenance of basic needs should be given top priority and the reasonable wage level should be \$33 per hour (Oriental Daily, 2009). The Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labour Unions suggested setting the wage level at \$35 in order to maintain the standard of family living (The Sun, 2009). Overall, the labour side insisted that \$33 per hour was an acceptable level to maintain such high living standard in a city such as Hong Kong (Headline Daily, 2010a). Finally, the PMWC organized a series of consultation meetings for all stakeholders. On 30 August 2010, the Commission announced their consensual wage level and sent it to the Executive Council for consideration. Lastly, the statutory minimum wage came into force on 1 May 2011 and the initial wage level was \$28 per hour.

Analysis of the Minimum Wage Level Legislation: A Neopluralistic Perspective

In the previous part, we discussed that the dominant mode of power dynamics in Hong Kong is neopluralism. From this angle, when we say that neopluralism is

applicable to minimum wage level legislation, it should be characterized by (1) open platforms should be established for public participation, (2) government has its own policy preference, and (3) the business sector exerts considerably more influence than other groups. In the following parts, it will discuss these characteristics one by one.

Platforms for Public Participation

Dahl and Stinebrickner (2003) argue that one central feature of neopluralism is that platforms for public expression, criticism and protest are available. In fact, various groups in society actively influence the policy making in an attempt to ensure that the decisions made by the government match their interests. This point will be illustrated in this case.

Since the establishment of the PMWC in 2008, many meetings have been provided for various stakeholders with confrontational interests for the discussion on an acceptable wage level. Totally, 101 groups have attended the consultation meetings, including the representatives of labour unions, business chambers, think tanks, wage concern groups as well as companies, to express their views on a reasonable wage. The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, a representative of the big companies, proposed that a wage level should be established from \$23 to \$26 and warned the public to get ready that some companies would have no choice but to dismiss their staff if the wage level was higher than \$26. It would undoubtedly result in a wave of unemployment (Ming Pao, 2010a). Oxfam Hong Kong, a long-term observer of the labour conditions, and HKCTU, labour unions in Hong Kong, also emphasized that the wage level should be set at \$33 in order to maintain the basic family living standard. Ms. Teresa Cheng Yuek-wah, the chairwoman of the PMWC, promised to review all comments and questions respectively after the meetings (Headline Daily, 2010b).

Apart from the public participation, government invitation is important to indicate public expression within the institutions. Under the Terms of Reference, the Commission was responsible for consulting every stakeholder who completed the consultation submission. With regard to the case of minimum wage settlement, three formal consultations were conducted when drafting the pay level. In the first stage, the Commission held 16 meetings with 83 major affected organizations including associations of property management, security and cleaning services, the retail sector and catering industry. In the second stage, the Commission aimed at collecting public opinions and expanding to more affected sectors. Overall, more than 7,500 written submissions were received and 17 meetings were organized with 66 organizations mainly from the catering industry, property management, security and cleaning sector as well as some policy research institutes. During the final period, the Commission consulted under-paid sectors while nine consultation meetings were conducted and 11 associations attended.

Besides, the political parties and civil society groups with different interests were important to act as the mediator between the government and public. According to Ip

Wai-ming, "some frontline workers may not be interested in current affairs, so our union has two important roles. Firstly, we have to facilitate the opinion collection from workers and then reflect to the Commission. Secondly, we have to explain the cost and benefit of setting different wage levels for encouraging further discussion and participation. Those documents include a lot of technical words and workers may not fully understand them so our team has to explain carefully" (Ip Wai-ming, personal communication, 6 March, 2012). Ho Chun-kit, the policy officer of Oxfam Hong Kong, also agreed with the important role of civil society and political parties in the case of the minimum wage. According to Ho, "Oxfam, as one of the well-known social groups in Hong Kong, has collected the opinions from the public through our research team. This team is significant in arranging those opinions and reflecting them to the government. Also, we have our own research findings to present to the public and facilitate the discussion in society" (Ho Chun-kit, personal communication, 22 February, 2012). Overall, we can see that an open platform was established for public expression, government invitation as well as parties and group's mediation which matched the first indicator of neopluralism.

Government's Policy Preference towards Minimum Wage Legislation

Neopluralists have accepted that the government can and does forge its own sectional interests (Heywood, 2013). In short, government shapes its own policy which is favourable to it (Hill, 2005).

In a broader sense, the attitude of government on the minimum wage could be clearly reflected in the policy address. Donald Tsang (2007) repeatedly encouraged different enterprises to join the "Wage Protection Movement" in order to maintain their service level and retain high-quality staff in his Policy Address of 2007. According to Ip Wai-ming, "The Hong Kong government has long emphasized the principle of 'big government, small government'. Therefore, the government was not willing to set up the minimum wage at first. The reason is the Chief Executive initially worried about the violation of this principle and, more significantly, the expansion of the burden and responsibility for the government. The Chief Executive always puts the economic development as the top consideration while the minimum wage has inevitably been regarded as a challenge to the economy. Therefore, the minimum wage legislation needs to follow the economic agenda and that is the reason to delay it for so long. Minimum wage policy is also a sensitive issue for the government as it directly relates to the interests of the business sector so the government has to handle this issue carefully" (Ip Wai-ming, personal communication, 6 March, 2012). Until 2008, the government had shifted its focus on minimum wage issues from a challenge to the economy to reduce the reliance on public finances. In the Policy Address of 2008, Tsang (2008) asserted that the minimum wage was capable to move the recipients from public service to self-reliance. According to him, "minimum wage encourages able-bodied recipients of the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) to rejoin the workforce and motivate them to move from welfare to self-reliance" (Tsang, 2008, para. 66). This

strategy incrementally gained the support of the business sector as many of them worried that a heavy social burden might result in the rise of tax payments. The concerns of the business sector were the wage level that they had to afford rather than the legislation for the minimum wage.

However, as the economic growth and reactions of the business sector were the top considerations, Donald Tsang tactically made use of the appointment of the PMWC to make sure that the government preference was reflected in the policy outcomes. This Commission was legally responsible for providing advice to the Chief Executive on the first minimum wage level. The composition included 13 members evenly appointed from the business community, labour sector, academia and government departments (Labour Department, 2009). The missions were clearly shown in the Terms of Reference:

"The PMWC adopts the evidence-based approach and aims to report to the Chief Executive its recommendation about the statutory minimum wage rate. The Commission must maintain a balance between minimizing the loss of low-paid job and sustaining Hong Kong's economic growth and competitive. The task is to: (1) advise the Chief Executive on the appropriate mechanism for determining statutory minimum wage, (2) advise the Chief Executive on the initial wage level based on the mechanism, (3) study the possible impact to the local economy, including its effect on pay, employment and economic competitiveness, particularly of the low-pay sectors and small and medium enterprises, (4) consult stakeholders in carrying out its work in the above (PMWC, 2010)."

In theory, the PMWC could be fully in charge of setting the initial minimum wage and thus extended a certain degree of power. But, in practice, the government was able to influence the Commission through controlling the appointment of members. In terms of personnel, all 13 members including ten non-official and three official members were appointed by the Chief Executive (Information Services Department, 2009). Moreover, the government was capable of having an influence through three official members, i.e. Permanent Secretary for Labour and Welfare, Permanent Secretary for Commerce and Economic Development and Government Economist. This appointment has been criticized by the pro-labour legislators. In a meeting of the Legislative Council, Ip Wai-ming suggested that three official representatives should not hold the voting rights on this issue in order to maintain the "neutrality" of government and they should only give the official information for all committee members' consideration. However, Cheung Kin-chung, the Secretary for Labour and Welfare, rejected this suggestion immediately by emphasizing the expertise and experience of his colleagues to handle this case but Cheung had never explained the role of the official members within the committee. Li Fung-ying, another pro-labour legislator, also complained about this unfair combination and criticized the intentions of the government. She criticized the government for how it played dual roles (player and judge) at the same time (Hong Kong Economic Journal, 2010). In short, the PMWC was endowed with a certain extent of power, but it was

autonomous in terms of implementation as it had to follow the overall direction of the government when drafting the initial wage level.

Apart from the appointment, the government was also criticized for actively intervening in the negotiation. In a dinner gathering with the HKFTU, Donald Tsang was reported as suggested that the minimum wage should be started at a lower level in order to ensure stable economic adaptability, implying that the labour sector should give up pursuing their targeted wage of \$33 (The Sun, 2010). This sparked criticisms from the pro-labour Legislative Councillors. Lee Cheuk-yan criticized Tsang for not showing respect to the PMWC. Leung Yiu-chung, the legislator from the Neighbourhood and Worker's Services Centre, emphasized that the Chief Executive should treasure the independence of the Commission (Ming Pao, 2010b). Both of them criticized the government for clearly protecting business interests by applying pressure on the labour sector. Furthermore, Ip Wai-ming had admitted that Donald Tsang proposed that the minimum wage should be initially established at a careful level while incrementally increasing it later. Tsang wanted the labour sector to make concessions to the business side (The Sun, 2010). From the above case, evidently, the government was not able to be neutral as required by classical pluralism.

Last but not least, after making the final decision on the wage level, the PMWC had to submit it to the Chief Executive and Executive Council for final approval. In theory, Donald Tsang was able to reject any proposed wage level if he was not satisfied. Although the wage level was accepted, the final decision-making power was in the hands of the Chief Executive (Information Services Department, 2011). Therefore, the government is a political actor as required by neopluralism with a clear policy preference, rather than being neutral in nature.

Business Domination in the Negotiation over the Statutory Minimum Wage Level

"Any government official who understands the requirement of his position and the responsibilities that market oriented system throw on businessmen will therefore grant them a privileged position. He simply understands that public affairs in market oriented systems are in the hands of two groups leaders, government and business, who must collaborate and that to make the system work government leadership must often defer to business leadership" (Lindblom, 1977, p.175). In this aspect, although the above analysis indicates that open platforms are available for various stakeholders to participate in the policy making process, the power distribution among them is uneven whereas the business sector enjoys a privileged position.

In the first place, since the business and professions possessed substantial economic power, they had long been the prime target for political co-optation (Cheung & Wong, 2004). The government appointed them in advisory bodies, thus enabling them to exert a great influence within the institutions (Goodstadt, 2005). This similar pattern could be seen in the PMWC, in which six out of ten non-official members were from business and academia which held more than half of the seats in the Commission

(Information Services Department, 2009). The appointment system directly permitted the government to expand its political representation by co-opting newly emerged groups and sectors into the existing system (Ngo, 2000). In fact, Lee Cheuk-yan mentioned that, apparently, the Chief Executive attempted to balance the interests between the business and labour sides as well as inviting academia to join the negotiation. But after carefully reviewing their backgrounds, it was obvious that three representatives from academia tended to be conservative and closed to business interests. In other words, the labour force became weak and less influential (Apple Daily, 2010b). Based on the analysis, these three academic representatives (two business and economics scholars and a social psychologist) closely cooperated with the business sector and government with previous experience in different committees. It is obvious that if the government sided with the business sector, the labour side would be in a different position within the PMWC while the academics tended to side with the government and business sector (Wong, 2014).

Despite the fact that there was a growing amount of public participation, the business sector still held the dominant position in the communication channels (Boyer King, 2004). Although the Commission held a lot of consultation meetings to invite various stakeholders to express and collect their opinions, the channels for the labour side were far less than the business representatives. Ip Wai-ming claimed that “although the Commission has sent invitation letters to the HKFTU, only our honorary president, Cheng Yiu-tong, received this invitation at that time. The minimum wage is related to all grassroots and workers in Hong Kong. None of our members have received any call or invitation. Even worse, according to the invitation letter, the Commission only offers 45 minutes for discussion on this complicated and important issue. Hence, the Commission is totally insincere when it says it will listen to the pro-labour side” (Ming Pao, 2009b). Li Fung-ying, legislator of the Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labour Unions, had this similar view towards the dissatisfactory communication channels from the Commission. It was unacceptable to hold the consultation meeting with an association without discussing the time and venue (Ming Pao, 2009b).

Besides the invitation, the consultation channels were also dominated by the business representatives. Indeed, the PMWC reported that 101 organizations attended the three consultation meetings (PWMC, 2010). Based on the analysis, 70 out of 101 associations represented the business interest whereas only 27 organizations appeared on behalf of the labour side. Table 1 indicates the distribution:

Table 1: Content Analysis of Groups Attending the Provisional Minimum Wage Consultations Meetings

Background	Number of Associations (Percentage)
Business Representatives	70 (69.31%)
Labour Representatives	27 (26.73%)
Others	4 (3.96%)
Total	101 (100%)

Source: Author's analysis; calculated by the PWMC, 2010, pp.124-126

From the above analysis, nearly 70 percent of associations were representing the business sector whereas only 27 percent appeared on behalf of the labour side. Clearly, the business sector was more influential in terms of the number of participants while the labour side was afforded an under-privileged status. The reason might be that the minimum wage seriously affected the interests of the business sector and it had put more resources into organizing associations and expanding their bargaining power. By doing so, the business sector believed that this would apply large political pressure on the PWMC to keep the wage level as low as possible while front-line workers might not have adequate time and knowledge to deal with this direct influential issue.

In addition, the PMWC not only suggested the amount of minimum wage level but also proposed the mechanism to decide the rate level. Apparently, the Commission attempted to strike a balance between the business and labour sides by setting a median amount of \$28 per hour. It seems that this wage level was a balance between the two confrontational interests of the business side which demanded \$24 and labour side which aimed for \$33. Then, it was easy to jump to the conclusion that this \$28 minimum wage level was the result of government's mediation to balance the interests from the business and labour sectors. However, this might not be true.

According to the PMWC (2010), the initial minimum wage rate was identified by a calculating mechanism called the "basket of indicators". In general, this mechanism facilitated the formulation of the wage level by considering four categories of indicators including (1) general economic condition, (2) labour market conditions, (3) economic competitiveness, and (4) standard of living (Labour Department, 2010). A summary is given in the following table:

Table 2: Summary of the Basket of Indicators

Indicators	Measurement(s)
(1) General Economic Conditions	Latest economic performance and forecasts
(2) Labour Market Conditions	(i) Labour demand and supply
	(ii) Wage level and distribution
	(iii) Wage differentials
	(iv) Employment characteristics
(3) Economic Competitiveness	(i) Productivity growth
	(ii) Labour costs
	(iii) Operating characteristics of enterprises
	(iv) Entrepreneurship, business sentiment and solvency
	(v) Relative economic freedom and competitiveness
(4) Standard of Living	(i) Changes in employment earnings
	(ii) Changes in consumer prices

Source: PMWC, 2010, p.51

From the above analysis, it is not difficult to see that most indicators are favourable to the business rather than labour sector. In general, the business side strived for the inclusion of more pro-business indicators, concerning business interests, in the top considerations while the labour side demanded more pro-labour indicators to measure the minimum wage level (Ming Pao, 2010c). In return, most indicators were related to economic concerns which are the major interests of the business side. Economic competitiveness, for instance, was more closely related to business concerns and operation of business in Hong Kong while only one indicator of the labour camp's concern, "standard of living", was included. However, the standard of living being considered at individual instead of family level was the primary dissatisfaction of the labour side.

Apart from pushing the pro-business indicators in the measurement, the wage level set at \$28 was certainly conservative (Au Yeung, 2013). The business sector, in fact, technically had considered how to reduce the cost from the minimum wage. In March 2011, a couple of months after the implementation of the minimum wage, the Employers' Federation, formed by major enterprises in Hong Kong, posted a newspaper advertisement urging all employers to exclude employees' meal hours and paid days off from the salary calculation, effectively cutting salaries for some employees. They claimed that this was in accordance with the law and would avoid an effective wage beyond the statutory level. Certainly, the labour unions made strong criticisms against the employer side and criticized the employers for exploiting legal loopholes. Some labour unionists afterwards agreed that they had already conceded defeat on this issue, implying that they had admitted that both meal hours and holidays had to be excluded under the designed wage calculations (Wong, 2014).

Overall, the case of minimum wage regulation reflected that the legislation was largely a by-product of the excesses of business, instead of a shift of values of the Hong Kong government and business elites (Wong, 2014). The formulation of labour protection policies was quite difficult in Hong Kong when both government and the business sector took the side of anti-labour protection regulation. Although, officially speaking, the government provided a platform among different stakeholders and it seemed that the wage level balanced the desire between employers and employees, in fact, it favours the business sector. This business-oriented strategy not only existed in the case of statutory minimum wage level settlement but also other policies like the civil servant payment policy (Fong, 2008) and environment policy (Francesch, 2004). The reason behind this was that most citizens merely paid special attention to the policy output which means the \$28 per hour instead of the negotiation process and mechanism to create it. As a result, it seems that the wage level balanced the interests between both sides, but, in fact, it favours the business sector more than the labour. From this perspective, the case of the statutory initial minimum wage represented a good illustration of how neopluralist theories are applicable to Hong Kong and it also offers a prominent example to understand the latest features of the territory's policy making process.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the case of the minimum wage level legislation in Hong Kong and argues that this policy is basically a pro-business one from the perspective of neopluralism. The minimum wage is a controversial issue and has been debated for more than a decade. Although open platforms were available to the public, the government obviously had its own policy preferences. It was under this circumstance that the business sector was able to dominate the policy making process while the voices from the labour side were limited in influencing the policy making process. But, civil society and the public have been more active as well as more mature than in the past. Different pro-labour associations, for example, even combined themselves into the "People's Alliance for Minimum Wage" which aimed at expanding their bargaining power in relation to both the government and business sector. However, the power dynamics are still uneven.

No matter whether before or after handover, the government has long heavily relied on the support of the business sector to promote economic development and minimize the financial burden of the social security system. As mentioned by Lindblom (1977), in a market-oriented economy, not only does the government have to collaborate with business, but it must also often defer to business leadership to make the system work. Throughout these years, the issue of government-business collaboration has been a sensitive issue in Hong Kong. The recent scandal of corruption of former high-ranked officials and property developers recalled the public dissatisfaction with government-business collusion and it has been a common and influential accusation to challenge the legitimacy of the government. The case of statutory minimum wage level settlement was only the tip of the iceberg; there are still many hot and controversial issues like employees' rights to collective bargaining and bringing statutory standard working hours in line with the confrontational state-union relations. However, as long as the government still adopts the mindset of neopluralism, these confrontational relations are likely to be more radical in the foreseeable future.

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Philosophical Foundation of Hong Kong Tertiary Civic Education Policy: Formation of Trans-Cultural Political Vision

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Abstract

This paper explores the philosophy of tertiary civic education in Hong Kong. It does not only investigate the role of tertiary education that can play in civic education, but also explores the way to achieve the aim of integrating liberal democratic citizenship and collective national identity in the context of persistent conflicts between two different identity politics in Hong Kong: politics of assimilation and politics of difference. As Hong Kong is part of China and is inevitably getting closer cooperation with the Mainland in the future, this paper argues that Hong Kong citizenship should affirm its own distinctiveness while also identifying with Chinese nationality. Thus, tertiary civic education should foster a trans-cultural political vision so that the two different horizons can be synthesized, and the political framework and identity can be transformed in order to reduce conflicts between the two peoples.

Keywords: tertiary civic education, Hong Kong, trans-cultural political vision

Introduction

With the development of Hong Kong political reform and the increasing interaction between Hong Kong people and Mainlanders, the Hong Kong-Mainland conflicts have intensified in recent years, such as the occurrence of Occupy Movement, the anti-parallel trading movement, and the controversies of moral, civic, and national education in Hong Kong. For Zhang Dejiang, the National People's Congress Chairman, these conflicts highlight the urgency of reinforcement of national education. However, Chan Kin-man, Occupy Movement co-founder, criticizes Zhang for imposing national education on people in a top-down manner while neglecting dissatisfactions and real appeals of Hong Kong youths (Apple Daily, 2015). So, in the face of continuing conflicts between Hong Kong and the Mainland, what kind of civic education do Hong Kong youths need? While a few empirical studies have been made on Hong Kong civic education (Fairbrother, 2003; Lai & Byram, 2012), the philosophical exploration of Hong Kong civic education, in particular in tertiary education, has been largely neglected. Probably, as some scholars have argued, the government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) often lacks visions in policy-making. Even if there is such a vision, it is usually bureaucratic driven which is short of philosophical reflection.

This paper attempts to study the philosophy of tertiary civic education in the context of cultural political conflicts between pan-democratic and pro-Beijing camp. In this paper, I will first briefly discuss about the development of Hong Kong civic education which was driven by tension between democratization and nationalization. I argue that underlying these tensions, no matter in social political or in civic education, there is a deeper clash between two different identity politics. On the one hand, Hong Kong is driven by politics of assimilation, to achieve a better integration with Mainland China. On the other hand, many Hong Kong people strongly identify with local distinctive value and social political administration. They recognize themselves as Hong Kongers prior to Chinese, and resist to be assimilated by Mainland China. Indeed, because of their particular historical background, Hong Kong people should uphold its distinctiveness on the one hand, and seek to identify themselves with Chinese national identity, on the other. With this dilemma, it is argued that, Hong Kong tertiary civic education should aim at cultivating a trans-cultural political vision so that Hong Kong students can formulate their own identities based on Hong Kong's particular historical condition while maintaining hermeneutical dialogue with Mainland China. With the hermeneutical theory by Gadamer, such dialogue and inter-cultural exchange can challenge students' existing framework, broaden their horizons, and hopefully lead to framework transformation which can integrate two conflicting cultures.

The Development of Civic Education in Hong Kong

Civic education is an important component of education. It fosters citizens to use their rights and to assume their obligations to participate the public life in democracy with necessary knowledge and skill. Maintenance of a democratic society must rely on the quality of its citizens. However, the development of civic education in Hong Kong is still at the preliminary stage. Before the reunification in 1997, civic education was deliberately de-emphasized. Because of the ideological struggle against the revolutionary nature of political education in Mainland China, the Hong Kong British Government tended to depoliticize Hong Kong's educational curriculum in order to maintain a stable social environment and economic growth, and in reaction to the young people's potentially destabilizing patriotic sentiments (Fairbrother, 2003, pp. 6-12). However, in the 1980s, as the negotiation between Britain and China about Hong Kong's handover started and 1989 Tiananmen Square protests occurred, the demand for democratization and political rights intensified in Hong Kong. The requests of civic education to strengthen the sense of political participation and human right education were raised by pressure groups. On the other hand, there were also requests from pro-Beijing camp advocating more national education. Approaching the period of handover, students' civic knowledge was found to be barely satisfactory, in particular their knowledge about and attitude towards China. Thus, there was strong government tendency to revise civic education curriculum contents, to enhance the understanding of China and to strengthen national identity. And the promotion of national education and patriotism became an important element in curriculum development after handover.¹ However, there are still two deficiencies in the current curriculum of civic education.

First, throughout these years, the curriculum of civic education mainly focused on primary and secondary education (Education Bureau, 2008), while the role of tertiary education in civic education has been neglected. We should never underestimate the significance of civic education at the primary and secondary level. However, if civic education is an important way to foster quality of citizens, tertiary education, as part of the education process, unavoidably bears the responsibility to cultivate citizens with reason and spirit to lead (Branson, 1998). As the goal of civic education is to foster the moral political engagement, it should cultivate the commitment of democratic ideals, such as respect for persons, rational engagement and procedural fairness; it should also foster the development of moral reasoning and the adoption of others' viewpoints emerged from reasoned consideration. Also contained is a comprehension of globalization, the diversity of Hong Kong society, the Hong Kong political institutions and its relation with the Mainland. Finally, substantive knowledge of certain controversial issues, no matter in Hong Kong, in the Mainland or in the global world, is also crucial. Students should be able to examine complicated situations in which different values are often in conflict, to employ both substantive knowledge and moral reasoning to evaluate problems and relevant values, to make independent judgments on relevant issues, and to act on their judgments. Obviously, tertiary education provides an important environment for students to acquire relevant knowledge and to cultivate these capacities. Thus, it is necessary to reflect on the role of tertiary civic education in Hong Kong.

Second, civic education in post-colonial times is basically a kind of territorialized education, which is characterized by a "One Country, Two Systems" notion of citizenship. This involves both local citizenship and national citizenship that are structured by very different political beliefs and values (Lai & Byram, 2012, p. 2-3). The basic reason is that Hong Kong is not a nation-state. It used to be a British colony; it has a particular historical context which is very different from other cities in the Mainland; and it is experiencing re-integration with sovereign China after the political handover. Thus, the national identity of Hong Kong is very different from that advocated in Mainland China. Due to democratization, re-nationalization and globalization after the handover, civic education in Hong Kong is very different from the national education in the Mainland. Basically, there are two aims for the civic education after reunification. They are to develop democratic citizenship, that is, to foster competent members of political democracy, on the one hand, and to enhance the sense of national identity. However, these two aims are in tension, in particular in the context of recent increasing conflicts between Hong Kong and Mainland China. Hong Kong's colonial history makes Hong Kong people's identity more liberal, individualistic and democracy-laden, which is very different from the national identity advocated in the Mainland that stresses homogeneity, collectivism and socialist-laden. This can be seen as the conflict between democratization and nationalization of civic education. This conflict is indeed parallel to the conflicts of two identity politics in Hong Kong after handover, as shown in the following discussion. The convergence of these two very different identities after the reunification seems to be particularly difficult, if not

impossible. Therefore, further reflection on Hong Kong civic education is essential.

Conflicts of Two Identity Politics

In 2011, the Education Bureau of Hong Kong has proposed the curriculum of moral and national education, which has replaced the existing moral and civic education in order to enhance national identity. However, the proposal has sparked great controversies and protests in the city. In particular, the "China Model National Conditions Teaching Manual", published by the National Education Services Centre under government funding was criticized as biased and brain-washing. The manual which describes the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as an "advanced, selfless and united ruling group", whereas criticizing the Republican and Democratic Parties of the United States as a "fierce inter-party rivalry [that] makes the people suffer", has caused repugnance to many Hong Kong people and a series of protests by different pressure groups (Wong, 2012). The curriculum is criticized as "brainwashing", indoctrinating the youth into unquestioning support of China's Communist Party. Even though the Secretary for Education, Eddie Ng has publicly criticized the manual as biased, it still cannot allay worries and suspicion of the public. Finally, the government has to delay the commencement of the subject by introducing a three-year trial period.

Apart from the curriculum of moral and national education, there also exist lots of different social cultural conflicts in Hong Kong. For instance, the controversies of political reform and the Occupy Central movement have deeply divided Hong Kong society. The consensus between pro-establishment and pan-democratic camps seems to be hardly achievable. The cultural clash between Hong Kong people and Mainlanders due to the Individual Visit Scheme launched in 2003 has also induced a radical anti-Mainland movement, and describing the Mainlanders derogatorily as "locusts" which destroy every green thing wherever passes through. This has also caused the rise of the idea of indigenism which aims at "safeguarding rule of law, freedoms, fair competition and other core values that took Hong Kong over a hundred of years to build, as well as Hong Kong's culture and traditions", as Lee Yee, the commentator states (Lee, 2013).

On the surface, the conflict is due to the political administrative and economic mishandlings by the HKSAR government. However, the underlying cause of the conflict is actually the clash of two different identity politics. Indeed, in the face of increasing multiculturalism, western countries have also investigated about identity politics and multicultural education. However, the identity politics in Hong Kong are different from the western controversy about multiculturalism. In the western debates, liberal democracy is the mainstream political ideology, while certain marginalized cultural groups seek for equal recognition and positive accommodation of cultural differences from the society. Rather, in Hong Kong's debates, socialist Marxism with Chinese characteristics is the dominant ideology, whereas the liberal democratic ideal in Hong Kong is marginalized. Therefore, it is argued that, instead of the model of western conflict between politics of liberalism and politics of multiculturalism, the clash in

Hong Kong is indeed between "politics of assimilation" and "politics of difference".

The politics of assimilation was driven by economic and political factors. Economically, the Hong Kong SAR government and many businessmen find that the close economic integration with Mainland China is important for sustaining Hong Kong economic development. Indeed, in the first few years of the post-1997 era, the Hong Kong SAR government did not accord high priority to economic co-operation with the Mainland. It simply attempted to maintain Hong Kong's role as an international finance, trade and services centre. However, as the crisis engendered by the Asian Financial Crisis, and the China's entry into the WTO, the SAR government started to be aware of the significance of co-operation with the Mainland. Therefore, the SAR government has become much more active in its economic co-operation with Mainland China since 2001 (Cheung, 2012, p. 200); and we can see, there follows the idea of regional co-operation of Pearl River Delta, the signing of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) and the Individual Visit Scheme. As the economic development of China has become vigorous, it also offers "a unique opportunity for Hong Kong to transform itself into a leading financial centre for China" (Cheung, 2012, p. 202). In 2008, the global financial crisis has led to recession for many western countries; and it has added a significant downside risk to the Hong Kong economy. As China's economy maintained a high GDP growth and did not have a recession, many western countries, as well as Hong Kong, are aware of the importance of closer co-operation with the Mainland; and Hong Kong's economy is under the threat of being marginalized in the face of the Mainland's rapid development (Cheung, 2012, p. 205). Hong Kong's former central banker Joseph Yam Chi-kwong also warned that the political conflicts can hamper Hong Kong's integration with Mainland China and its economic development (South China Morning Post, 2014).

Politically, the aspiration of assimilation is driven by a republican vision which emphasizes the idea of collective self-government. Apart from freedom and equality of respect, the republican vision also involves realization of two values: the emancipation of individuals and civic integration (Maclure and Taylor, 2011, p. 29). Pro-Beijing camps are indeed highly dissatisfied with the existing resistance of many Hong Kong youths and their negative attitude towards the nation. Many officials of CCP conceived of Hong Kong as the lost son being colonized by the British power (Jiang, 2014a). They have been indoctrinated a series of western ideology, that is liberal democracy which stresses human rights, values of individual liberty and equality, that are alienated from the Mainland. The conflicts between Hong Kong and the Mainland after the reunification, such as the rejection to enact a security law based on Article 23 of the Basic Law, the resistance of national education curriculum, the recent movements of exclusion of the Mainland Chinese and the proposal of civil nomination and self-determination, are perceived by Beijing as threats to the sovereignty of the country over Hong Kong. This shows that many Hong Kong people are still controlled by the western ideology. Thus, they cannot fully identify with China and accept the fact of returning to the motherland. It is contrary to the idea of patriotism in the Mainland

which stresses the significance of the nation as a whole. It damages the relation between Hong Kong and the other provinces, and weakens the solidarity and the sense of belonging among Chinese.

On the other hand, the politics of difference in Hong Kong seeks the recognition of its own unique identity. For many Hong Kong people, they seek the recognition of Hong Kong as a "distinct society" and make this recognition as the basis of its cultural, legal and political administrative development.

As Hong Kong has been administrated as a separate British colony for 150 years, the fusion of traditional Chinese culture and western culture has constituted a unique local identity of "Hong Kong Chinese" distinguished from the Chinese in the Mainland. Generally, many Hong Kong people are very proud of their cultural and political development, that is different from Mainland China. They had enjoyed freedom of speech, market economy and an effective government administration in Hong Kong. That is why they resist the patriotic education held in Mainland China which attempts to unite the entire population and justify the party's legitimacy to rule by equating the nation with the party-state. They are also worried to be assimilated in Hong Kong's cooperative development with the Mainland, and finally losing its autonomy in its future planning. In particular, some may conceive that the culture of stressing cooperation and harmony in the Mainland would force people to be "muted", and "river-crabbed" ("river crab", Chinese 「河蟹」, pinyin: *héxiè*, a homonym for "harmony," which is a euphemism for internet censorship).

The rise of indigenous awareness and local consciousness also reinforces the rejection of being assimilated. The sense of indigenesness has been raised with the uprising of the Hong Kong economy and the distinctive Cantonese popular culture since the 1970s. Hong Kong Cantonese TV programs, movies and pop songs in these decades are very popular not only in Hong Kong and the Mainland China, but also in overseas Chinese communities. Therefore, many Hong Kong people are strongly identified with the local culture and perceive the closer integration as initiating cultural invasion from the Mainland.

On the other hand, a series of government mal-administrations in the Mainland, such as the land reform movement, the movements against the "three evils" and the "five evils", the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution and the religious persecution by the Communist Party over the past 60 years have also frustrated Hong Kong people's recognition of Mainland China. The event of Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 has further strengthened the fear of the Communist Party, the affirmation of Hong Kong unique political administrative system and the aspiration of democracy. Indeed, political citizenship in Hong Kong was basically repressed under British rule in the colonial days. However, the preparation of decolonization process in 1980s and 1990s has given an opportunity for the development of democracy in Hong Kong. It induces the aspiration of universal suffrage and the rejection of authoritarian government (Ku, 2012, p. 129).

In the early days of the reunification, many Hong Kong people were confident in the principle of "One Country, Two Systems," and believing that Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree of autonomy, as laid down in The Joint Declaration. However, many Hong Kong people have experienced the regression of freedom of speech, the increasing self-censorship of mass media, the growing inequality between rich and poor and the increasing intervention from Beijing after the reunification. People start worrying about the loss of a high degree of autonomy in Hong Kong.

Indeed, the recent rise of indigenous awareness is also shown in surveys on Hong Kong people's ethnic identity conducted by both Hong Kong University (HKU) and Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK). Generally speaking, around half of Hong Kong people would identify themselves as both "Chinese" and "Hongkongers." However, the recent CUHK survey shows that the portion of people who identified themselves as merely Chinese drops from 32.1% in 1997 to 8.8% at 2014. The portion of those choosing merely "Hongkongers" rises from the lowest 16.7% at 2008 to 26.4% in 2014 (CUHK CCPOS, 2014). The recent survey conducted by HKU also shows that the strongest index of identity feeling of Hong Kong people is as "Hongkongers", at 79.5 marks, while that of "Chinese" and "citizens of the PRC" are the lowest, at 62 and 54.4 marks respectively; they are also at their lowest since the compilation of these indices in 2008 (HKU POP, 2014). The rise of indigenous awareness and decline of the sense of Chinese identity are contrary to the China's economic development in recent years, thus they should be due to factors other than economic development.

Nevertheless, in the eyes of pro-Beijing scholars, Hong Kong's resistance against the national education and Mainland China is due to the brainwashing by the British government in the colonial day and the intervention from the "outside forces", such as western governments, human rights activists, democracy backers, Chinese dissidents, that aspire to use Hong Kong to thwart China's one-party Communist system. For instance, Jiang Shigong, deputy director of Peking University's Centre for Hong Kong and Macau Studies, asserts that the British Hong Kong government's promotion of democracy before reunification was not genuinely for the sake of Hong Kong people. Rather, it was just a strategy to enhance British bargaining power with China in the future. Unlike the Roman Empire, British imperialism was not an attempt to establish a great civilization through integrating different cultures. British colonization of Hong Kong was simply driven by England's utilitarian concern (Jiang, 2008, p. 59), and therefore it was opposed by Hong Kong leftists and the anti-imperialism movement. Nevertheless, Hong Kong 1967 Leftist riots had given an opportunity for the British Hong Kong government to oppress the Hong Kong leftists; and to launch their project of "winning the hearts and minds"² by demonizing communism through mass media in the colony (Jiang, 2008, p. 31). Furthermore, by introducing housing, education and other social welfare, the British Hong Kong government portrayed itself as a benevolent ruler. In the earlier colonial day, the British government repressed democracy development in Hong Kong because they had to prevent the infiltration of pro-communist leftists into the government. However, in the 1980s, in the face of the fact of

the future handover of Hong Kong to the Mainland, the British Hong Kong government started to promote democracy and to strengthen the sense of political citizenship in Hong Kong; and thus it induced Hong Kong local consciousness and distinctive identity, which was alienated from the Chinese identity in the Mainland. This caused trouble to the handover of sovereignty and effectively repressed the rise of Mainland China (Jiang, 2008, p. 72).

From these two different perspectives of Hong Kong, it seems that there is really a huge gap between pro-democratic and pro-Beijing camp, and between Hong Kong and the Mainland. Obviously, the causes of conflicts are not only different political visions, but also the lack of mutual trust and fear. Such conflicts seem to be hardly resolved in the short term. However, in the long term, the way to reduce the gap can only be achieved by enhancing mutual understanding. Thus, the reflection of civic education in Hong Kong has a practical urgency.

Basically, the author is very sympathetic with the aspiration of Hong Kong to be a distinct city with a distinctive Hong Kong identity. On the whole, Hong Kong differs from other Chinese societies in many ways: its freedom of speech and assembly, the stresses of human rights and the rule of law, its democratic politics and the efficient administrative system, the high degree of modernization and urbanization, the high standard of living, the majority with English proficiency and its exposure to foreign influence, the fluidity of society, the dominance of an economic and management elite, and its high international rankings in its economic freedom, financial and economic competitiveness. All these political values, institutions and culture are constitutive to the current success of Hong Kong development and its role as one of the world's greatest cities.

However, proponents of assimilation politics may argue that politics of difference will deteriorate the integrative function of citizenship. Too much emphasis of local distinctive citizenship means that Hong Kong people would lose their sense of collective belonging with the Mainlanders. It further diminishes their willingness to identify with China, making them difficult to cooperate and to compromise with the Mainlanders. Hong Kong people may then develop a purely instrumental attitude towards Mainland China. From this aspect, the danger of differentiated citizenship is that its emphasis of "the recognition and institutionalization of difference could undermine the conditions that make a sense of common identification and thus mutuality possible" (Carens, 2000, p. 193). Therefore, while stressing the distinctiveness of a Hong Kong identity, we can never neglect the relation between Hong Kong and Mainland China in the formation of citizenship.

Indeed, the search of recognition of a unique identity is not equivalent to rejection of Chinese identity. In reality, Hong Kong is a part of China. Hong Kong can never be an independent country. From the perspective of economic development and people's livelihood, many Hong Kong people also think that the closer integration between Hong Kong and the Mainland China is inevitable and would be beneficial to Hong Kong.

Indeed, most Hong Kong people, including pan-democrats, are patriots (Jiang, 2014b), although some claim that what they love is China as motherland rather than China as led by the Communist Party, whereas others claim that we cannot take out a ruling party while talking about love for their country. No matter how we understand patriotism, the fact is that Hong Kong people cannot understand themselves without relating themselves with current Mainland China; Hong Kong people are surely Chinese citizens. On the other hand, Hong Kong is a place of the fusion between Chinese and the western cultures; it can advance some kind of crossing between China and the international world. It can also function as an indication of the possible democracy in the future political development of China. Thus, the distinctiveness of Hong Kong and its particular relation to China can contribute to the development of China and its relation with the global world. Indeed, the principle of "One Country, Two Systems" dooms the notion of citizenship in Hong Kong to be a new kind of citizenship different from the socialist collectivist kind in the Mainland while keeping the Chinese nationality.

Tertiary Civic Education: Formation of Trans-Cultural Vision

The Significance of Tertiary Civic Education

If the main thrust of democracy is collective self-rule, civic education is then education in collective self-governing. This means that citizens are actively involved in their own governance rather than passively following dictums from others. Thus, citizenships imply political participation. However, it is not simply participation for its own sake. Citizens' political participation must be based on informed knowledge and critical evaluation; otherwise, democracy can lead to the tyranny of the majority. Therefore, many contemporary political theorists, such as Jürgen Habermas, John Rawls and Iris Marion Young, etc., propose the idea of deliberative democracy. The basic idea of deliberative democracy is that legitimate political decisions have to be based on sufficient discussions and debates among citizens under a reasonably promising environment. It implies various efforts to enhance the amount, quality and influence of public discussion.

The implication of deliberative democracy to civic education is that students need to learn to participate in public discussion, which could be face-to-face or mediated by social media. Students must learn to exercise critical deliberation among moral values and political ideas, to exercise personal or self-reflective choice. Thus, students need to establish the capacity for evaluating competing conceptions of moral values and political ideas. Society must avoid the inculcation in students of the "uncritical acceptance of any particular way or ways of life" (Gutmann, 1987, p. 44). They need to provide moral justification for their own views and actions, giving reason to justify them that would be accepted by others. In short, they should develop the abilities, knowledge and skills that lead them to understand current events and to discuss with others and influence decision making by government with the views they have developed and refined after deliberation. Practices of these discussions and debates

about current events seem to be especially promising in tertiary education.

Generally speaking, tertiary education emphasizes independent thinking and analytical skills instead of the capability to memorize. It encourages interaction and discussion and provides a more liberal environment for study. Most Hong Kong tertiary institutes demand that students study the subject of critical thinking, as well as some moral subjects, so that students learn how to form arguments critically, and deliberate over social issues. Indeed, study by Gregory P. Fairbrother (2003, pp. 107-134) also shows that the experience of tertiary education has significant influence on shaping students' citizenship and their national attitudes. By examining researches over three decades, Pascarella and Terenzini (2005) also argue that tertiary education has a substantial impact on knowledge and cognitive development, as well as on political beliefs, values and personal attitudes. College students usually become confident, autonomous and open-minded; they also become interested in cultural activities and become capable of thinking more abstractly and reflectively. As Anne Colby and Thomas Ehrlich assert, intellectual academic pursuit and civic development are mutually enhancing. As civic and political developments involve "the achievement of a more sophisticated and conceptually advanced understanding of complex social and ethical ideas", they are inevitably integral to intellectual growth (Colby and Ehrlich, 2000, p. xxv). Thus, tertiary education can play an essential role in the cultivation of citizenship.

However, in critical thinking, arguments require shared premises, which are not always present in conflicts between Hong Kong and the Mainland because of the very different worldviews and background understandings. Very often, these conflicts are hardly resolved because participants are lacking "sufficiently shared understandings to fashion a set of arguments with shared premises, or appeals to shared experiences and values" (Young, 2000, pp. 71-2). Therefore, with the increasing conflicts between the identity politics of locality and nationality, simply stressing the training in critical thinking is not enough. Tertiary civic education should also facilitate students with the trans-cultural political vision in which different horizons can be merged and a new vision can be created by comparing and articulating these contrasts.

Dialogical Hermeneutic Approach

Indeed, our current subject of critical thinking and analytic philosophy are very much determined by the Cartesian epistemology, which stresses the primacy of method and assumes the subject as the disengaged self. However, such epistemology is harshly criticized by phenomenologists, such as Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Charles Taylor and Hans Georg Gadamer. They argued that instead of being disengaged subject, our existence is primarily and foremostly "being-in-the-world." Prior to our detached stance towards the object, we are already involved and engaged in the world that we can never be fully disengaged. Such notion of an engaged self has provided the theoretical foundation for the philosophical hermeneutics and the necessity of dialogue and conversation with others in our self-understanding.

As we are always situated in the world, our understanding and moral judgment inevitably involve framework, or "horizon of significance" (Taylor, 1992, p. 38) or in Gadamer's term "prejudice" (Gadamer, 2004, p. 272), which is constituted by history and tradition in our community. For Gadamer, prejudice is not a negative notion; rather it is the necessary condition of our understanding and provides background for our judgment; it is prejudice that opens up to what is to be understood and evaluated. Furthermore, our moral values and judgment are shaping our self-understanding, because to understand who I am is to ask what is of crucial importance to us (Taylor, 1989, p. 30). Thus, our identities are largely constituted by the condition and history of our community. The hermeneutical theory can partly explain that the cause of current conflicts among Hong Kongers and the Mainlanders is due to different moral political frameworks. As the relation between Hong Kong and the Mainland is getting closer, our identity is bound to transcend local context and to acquire a cross-cultural significance (Dallmayr, 2009, p. 31).

In order to maintain the particular identity of Hong Kong people while reducing conflicts and to achieve greater consensus with Mainland China, Hong Kong tertiary civic education has to include two streams. First, apart from the grasp of history, culture and values integral to contemporary Hong Kong society, students must be able to have philosophical reflection on this culture and values. Students must identify the existence of debates and dilemma about these values and political concepts in the current moral political circle, and to deliberate the significance, the relevance and the integration of these values in Hong Kong. Second, apart from substantive understanding about the contemporary China, including its history, culture and ideology, students must also try to establish a trans-cultural vision, to surpass local vision and to acquire a new cross-cultural framework. By such trans-cultural vision, it is expected to achieve what Gadamer calls, "a fusion of horizons" (Gadamer, 2004, p. 305) in which a new political vision can be evolved that can integrate two different frameworks from Hong Kong and the Mainland. So apart from critical thinking, students should also study subjects about moral political philosophy and understanding contemporary China. Regarding to China and Hong Kong related subjects, students should be exposed to writings of scholars from Mainland China, as well as Hong Kong and western countries, to ensure that they can perceive and consider the situation from different perspectives. In contrast to the protest in the social movement, face-to-face dialogue with scholars and students from Mainland China through exchange programmes and study tours are particular favourable conditions to establish such trans-cultural vision. A genuine dialogue demands participants to be attentive to each other, to be modest and non-aggressive, willing to listen and refuse to overpower the others (Dallmayr, 2009, p. 27).

Participations in social movements are also important learning conditions of civic education. They provide students opportunities to reflect, to organize and to deliberate their ideas regarding certain issues. However, nowadays, many social movements in Hong Kong are driven by anger and hatred. It has engendered deep mutual mistrust and the sense of hostility towards each other; and thus obstructing genuine dialogue. A

condition of face-to-face dialogue with others without any existing political agenda could be complementary to civic education. It is also promising for students to open themselves and to try to understand others sympathetically without attempting to win others. In such dialogue, their original frameworks are challenged and they learn to listen to something foreign to them. Such a process of dialogue is different from a debate; its consequence is not the triumph of one stand over another. Rather, it is a mutual learning process with a frame of question and answer in which each acquires a better understanding of both others and themselves (Gadamer, 2004, p. 367-70).

To develop such a trans-cultural vision means that students are called not only to understand their own culture and tradition, but also to engage the complicated aspects of unfamiliar life-forms. Such understanding is tensional, because, for Gadamer, hermeneutical dialogue is always "based on a polarity between familiarity and strangeness" (Gadamer, 2004, p. 295). In the process of fusion of horizons, individuals are forced to engage the challenges of their unquestioned assumptions, and then to reflect and to revise their own frameworks in the process of communication. This tension also renders interpretation a circular characteristic which is called the "hermeneutical circle" (Gadamer, 2004, p. 293). It is an open circle developing a learning process and transformation of framework. In dialogue, the participants project their original understanding of the world that, nevertheless, gets crushed because others refused to be assimilated. Thus, a new comprehensive framework is needed which triggers a continuous modification of one's understanding of others and the world.

With respect to conflicts between people in Hong Kong and Mainland China, most of them are Chinese with similar traditions, and they may even have some close relatives living in both places. They are actually the same kind of Chinese a few decades ago. Indeed, most of Hong Kong people are migrated from the Mainland in 1950s and 60s because of civil war in China. In particular after the People's Republic of China was proclaimed in 1949, many people and corporations migrated to Hong Kong because of the bad living condition and the fear of persecution by the Communist Party. While Hong Kong had experienced a relatively stable social and economic development under the British colonization, China had gone through a period of turbulence caused by a series of political movements. For instance, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution launched by Mao have caused the death of several ten millions of people because of starvation and persecution. These movements have caused great social political instability, decline in economy and capacity of government to deliver goods and services, a generation of young adults are denied education, the growth of corruptions and political struggles in the government, and finally moral cultural regression of the whole country. The sequences of events left billions of Chinese struggling to survive in turbulence for over decades. This very different historical background over last few decades not only explains why the values and conducts are so different between Hong Kong people and the Mainlanders, but also reminds Hong Kong people that the distinctive cultural and moral identities they have fostered are partly out of luck. With such background knowledge, I expect, while affirming their

own values and conducts, Hong Kong people should broaden their horizons in understanding China, no longer showing contempt towards the Mainlanders; rather they should find how to communicate effectively and sympathetically with the Mainlanders.

Regarding to the politics, the resistance of democratic political reform by Beijing is due to their reflection of collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, shortly after Tiananmen Square protests at the same year. From a series of eight videos titled "Thinking of danger while living in safety: the lessons from the collapse of the Soviet Union Communist Party," which is required to be watched by all party members, it is known that from the perspective of CCP, the collapse of the Soviet Union is due to its rejection of communism and Marxism by their former political leaders. In particular, Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, advocated for democratization and openness of the Soviet Union which had finally led to the harsh public denouncement towards the communist party by the opposition factions. The videos blame Gorbachev for the end of the communist party which leads to the collapse of the country; and the principle may also be applied to China: the end of the party's rule would lead to the collapse and fragmentation of China (Callick, 2014, p. 60-62).

CCP's blaming for the political leaders as the factor of the collapse of the Soviet Union may not be right. For many westerners, the collapse of the Soviet Union is due to the problem of communism itself. CCP's prediction of the end of party's rule leading to the fragmentation of China is also controversial. We can see the democratic transition in Taiwan did not cause the disaster and destruction of the Taiwan society. No matter which is right, it is argued that the debate about political reform in Hong Kong cannot proceed without such background understanding of CCP. The negotiation with CCP cannot work without addressing its worries and concerns, even though it remains open to be discussed about how to respond to CCP's worries of political reform.

Criticisms and Response

Nevertheless, the trans-cultural civic education may face criticisms from liberal democrats and pro-Beijing's camp. Sometimes, Gadamer's notion of the "fusion of horizons" is criticized as being a hasty consensus, a facile compromise. It has conceded a truly democratic reform and given up values of freedom and justice in Hong Kong. Gadamer's stress on the role of tradition in interpretation is also accused of being too conservative, that it is obstructing political reform.

First, it should be noted that the fusion, suggested by Gadamer, is neither simply a convergence of different viewpoints, nor does it simply achieve a uniformity of beliefs by compromising. Its emphasis of tradition shows that while the process of understanding is inevitably relating the other to the tradition from which the other speaks, the tradition involved can be foreign to the interpreter's original framework which induces tensions and challenges to the interpreter's unquestioned assumption. Therefore, such trans-cultural interpretative action is actually a mutual revolutionary learning process based on evaluation and recognition of difference. The aim of such

process is leading to a framework transformation which can overcome conflicts among existing frameworks. Although the outcome of transformation is not fully consistent with the liberal democratic ideal, trans-cultural civic education is absolutely not a conservative approach.

Pro-Beijing scholars may also criticize the recognition of the distinctive Hong Kong identities for weakening the sense of belonging with Mainland China. Without substantive sharing of common goods, the nation can hardly be united; it will leave room for cultural invasion by foreign powers. To address the nationalist concern, I would argue, we have to distinguish fundamental elements which are core to constitute Chinese identity that must be conformed from additives that are valuable to locals and can be tolerated and allowed. China itself is a multi-cultural and multi-racial country; it also has to search for a way to reach unity in diversity, that is, "unity without uniformity and diversity without fragmentation" (Macpherson, 2014, p. 20). Instead of uniformity by coercion or indoctrination, recognition of the particularity of Hong Kong culture and respect of difference, without conceding on core elements of Chinese identity, can actually enhance rather than diminish the national solidarity. This can be seen from the recent history of mass migration of Hong Kong.

In 1980s and 90s, because of announcement of Joint Declaration and Tiananmen Square protests, many Hong Kong people have emigrated to other western countries, because they worried that Hong Kong would lose its freedom and distinctiveness after the reunification. Nevertheless, shortly before and after 1997, there was a wave of return migration partly because many people had changed their outlook of Hong Kong. They became confident in the principle of a high degree of autonomy under the "One Country, Two Systems," while they were also dissatisfied with the living conditions in foreign countries. Recently, the political conflicts between Hong Kong and Mainland China and the announcement of a white paper have re-joined the lost confidence of "One Country, Two Systems" and the discussion about mass migration. Thus, it seems that the recognition of particular Hong Kong identities helps to unify a deeply divided nation rather than to divide an already highly cohesive one. Trans-cultural civic education indeed supports the notion of unity in diversity. In the past, some pro-Beijing's politicians attempt to attain unity by assimilation, but it has caused resistance and division rather than cooperation in Hong Kong. Trans-cultural civic education perceives that the goal of unity is achieved not by coercion or assimilation, but by dialogue and recognition of differences. It involves the reformulation of identity that demands a process and participations of Chinese both in Hong Kong and the Mainland. This newly formed identity must be able to reflect the distinctiveness of Hong Kong identity while maintaining substantive cohesion to China.

Conclusion

While Hong Kong civic education attempts to integrate liberal democratic citizenship and socialist collective national identity, the persistent conflicts between two

identity politics seem to show that such aim is hardly achievable. In view of the particular historical background of Hong Kong, the author argues that Hong Kong people should affirm their own distinctive identities while identifying with their Chinese nationality. In the face of these two very different, conflicting cultures, Hong Kong tertiary civic education should foster a trans-cultural political vision which appreciates their own values and distinctive culture in Hong Kong while broadening their horizon in their continuous dialogue with the Mainlanders. The aim is to achieve a fusion of horizons so that students can reformulate their identity in response to challenges brought by the fast-changing relationship between Hong Kong and Mainland China. Nevertheless, this paper has only offered a preliminary exploration of the philosophical foundation for Hong Kong tertiary civic education policy. Substantial discussion and theoretical debates should be followed; and the details of curriculum and policy-making should be investigated in future study.

Acknowledgement

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Notes

1. Article by Thomas K. C. Tse (2004) has an in-depth discussion about the historical development and change of Hong Kong civic education policy before and after the handover.
2. "Winning the hearts and minds" is Jiang's own translation. We have to note that the Chinese words are 「洗腦贏心」, which is actually "brainwashing and heart winning" in literal translation.

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The Reconstitution of Advisory Committee on Teacher Education Qualifications to Committee on Professional Development of Teachers and Principals: Implications for Principals on Staff Development

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to introduce the tripartite structural model of "Initial, Professional, Leadership (IPL)" in Staff Development by examining the implications behind the three highlighted development areas of Committee on Professional Development of Teachers and Principals (COTAP) of Education Bureau (EDB) in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). Through the elaboration of the IPL model, principals and teachers could make better sense of the significance and the work of COTAP. In this paper, the reconstitution of Advisory Committee on Teacher Education Qualifications (ACTEQ) to COTAP is discussed as the policy background for the three highlighted development of COTAP in Initial Teacher Education (ITE), Teachers' Professional Development (TPD) and School Leadership (SL). Through the discussion of these three development areas, the tripartite structural model of IPL in Staff Development was proposed for explanation and discussion. In summary, this paper yields three useful policy implications for principals on Staff Development (SD). As such, principals' and teachers' competence would be enhanced under the model of IPL, thereby students' learning could be benefited in return.

Keywords: professional development, school leadership, school changes, Hong Kong

Introduction

Changing Education Landscape: from globalization to professional specialization

Principal and Teacher Professional Development

Principal and Teacher Professional Development (PD) provides principals and teachers with opportunities to explore new roles, develop new instructional techniques, refine their practice and broaden themselves, both as educators and as individuals (Komba and Nkumbi, 2008). It is also the key determining factor towards improved student performance. PD also provides principals and teachers with a way to apply

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what they have learnt directly to their teaching (Zakaria and Daud, 2009). Holland (2005) found that teachers were more likely to change their instructional practices and gain greater subject knowledge and improved teaching skills when their PD was directly linked to their daily experiences, as well as aligned with standards and assessments.

When it comes to the programming of PD, Darling-Hammond and McLaughlin (1995) highlighted the following 5 characteristics:

- PD must engage teachers in concrete tasks of teaching, assessment, observation and reflection, which will illuminate the processes of learning and development;
- PD must be grounded in inquiry, reflection and experimentation that are participant-driven;
- PD must be collaborative, involving a sharing of knowledge among educators and a focus on teachers' communities of practice, rather than on individual teachers;
- PD must be sustained, ongoing, intensive and supported by modeling, coaching and the collective solving of specific problems pertaining to practice; and
- PD must be connected to other aspects of school change.

In view of the above PD programming characteristics, PD can be construed and planned under different paradigm of worldview. Pitsoe & Maila (2012) elaborated the importance of two contrasting worldviews on the planning of PD. The first world-view is mechanistic (bureaucracy, Taylorism, Fordism, behaviorism, objectivity, process-based, linear, compartmentalized, and step-by-step-a clock metaphor). Mechanistic worldview shapes PD into more structural, top-down oriented, organizational, hierarchical, power-centralized and systematic framework.

In contrast, the second worldview is holistic world-view (Black, 1999). It governs PD into more situational, contingent, "one-size-cannot-fit-all", social, organic, relational, perceptual, complex, holistic and fluidic perspective.

Further to the elaboration of PD programming and planning due to two contrasting worldviews, the design of PD is mainly categorized into 5 models (Pitsoe & Maila, 2012; Sparks and Loucks-Horsley, 1989):

1. Individually guided development (Pitsoe & Maila, 2012)

This model assumes individuals are motivated by self-selecting their own learning goals. It also assumes self-directed development empowers teachers to address their own problems, thereby creating a sense of professionalism. Under this model, teachers design his or her own learning activities.

2. Observation and assessment (Pitsoe & Maila, 2012)

This model assumes the observer and the assessor act as "eyes and ears" for the

teacher. Observer gives feedback to teachers by observing teachers' classroom practice so as to improve teachers' instructional practices.

3. Involvement in a development or improvement process (Pitsoe & Maila, 2012)

This model assumes new skills or knowledge may be required and can be attained through reading, discussion, observation, training and experimentation. It is believed that this involvement can lead to new skills, attitudes and behavioral changes.

4. Training (Pitsoe & Maila, 2012)

This model assumes an expert teacher could serve as a trainer who selects the objectives, learning activities and outcomes in the training process. These outcomes involve awareness, knowledge, skills development, changes in attitudes, teachers' mentality changes, etc. It is believed that the most effective training programs include the exploration of theory, demonstrations of practice, supervised trials of new skills, feedback on performance and workplace coaching.

5. Inquiry (Pitsoe & Maila, 2012)

This model assumes teachers could formulate questions about their own practices and pursue answers to those questions. It also assumes that teachers could be reflective in their practices and take improvement actions for continuous improvement. Inquiry involves identification of a problem, data collection (qualitative, quantitative, literature review), data analysis and changes in practice. It can be done individually or in small groups.

These 5 models are not mutually-exclusive. Rather, it is the paramount task of principals to deploy the appropriate model(s) in respond to their own unique context.

Major Areas of Training programs for Principals and Teachers

Having understood the aforesaid 5 models of PD, the three major domains of PD are also introduced as follows:

1. Macroscopic or contextual domain:

- School reform and globalization (Hardy, 2008)
- Philosophical foundation, equity and expectation on students' academic achievement (National Staff Development Council [NSDC, 2007])
- Different phases of teachers' career (Dall'Alba & Sandberg, 2006)

2. Mesoscopic or organizational domain:

- Leadership style such as dynamic collaboration between teachers and principals on curricular instructional and assessment matters (Blasé & Blasé,

1999; Marks & Printy, 2003; Mitchell & Castle, 2005)

- Instructional leadership including teacher supervision and overseeing instruction (Fullan, 2002; Marks & Printy, 2003; Mitchell & Castle, 2005)
- Family involvement including knowledge and skills for other stakeholders (National Staff Development Council [NSDC, 2007])

3. Microscopic or classroom domain:

- Quality teaching including research-based instructional strategies and classroom assessment (National Staff Development Council [NSDC, 2007])
- First-year, induction, orientation or beginning teachership/ principalship (Glickman, Gordon and Ross-Gordon, 2007)
- Networking for collegial support or professional exchange (Glickman, Gordon and Ross-Gordon, 2007)
- Action Research (Williams, 2008)

Despite so, the above three main domains of PD can also be categorized or presented in various forms, depending on various contextual factors. Yet, the elements therein could be more or less the same, except the differences in some terminology.

Principal and Teacher Professional Development in Hong Kong

In Hong Kong, principal and teacher PD has undergone different changes in response to the contemporary education landscape. Before 1990s, there was absence of a very detailed PD framework for principals and teachers. In 1991, following the Public Sector Reform (PSR) of Reagan's administration in US and Thatcher's administration in UK, the introduction of School Management Initiative (SMI) in Hong Kong advocated the SMI schools to entitle 3 PD days per annum for their school-based development programs. In 1997, Hong Kong was reunified to China. The first Chief Executive of HKSAR, Tung Chee Wah, prioritized education as one of the key tasks for his administration. In 1999, along with the full implementation of SMI on territory basis, all schools could have 3 days per annum for professional development.

In 2002, Advisory Committee on Teacher Education and Professional Qualifications (ACTEQ) investigated the practice of principal & teacher PD under globalized contexts and launched the first Principals' Continuing Professional Development (CPD) framework. Under which, new principals need to take professional development programme for the first two years of service. For serving principals with two or more years of headship experience, they are required to study at a minimum of 150 hours of CPD over a three-year cycle.

In 2003, ACTEQ further developed a generic Teacher Competence Framework (TCF) for teachers (ACTEQ, 2003). In 2006, ACTEQ published an interim report on Teachers' CPD (ACTEQ, 2006). In 2009, ACTEQ further issued the third report on

Teachers' CDP with recommendations for future development (ACTEQ, 2009).

Under contemporary changing education landscape, ACTEQ focused more of its effort on (1) Teachers' Initial Teacher Education (ITE) and (2) Teachers' CPD but less on PD of (3) School Leadership (SL). In other words, the professional specialization among ITE, Teachers' CPD and SL was not very clear.

Policy Background & Rationale: The reconstitution of ACTEQ to COTAP

In 2013, ACTEQ was then reconstituted to Committee on Professional Development of Teachers and Principals (COTAP) under such policy terrain, with clearer specialization for the advancement of (1) ITE, (2) Teachers' CPD and (3) SL. In addition, three new sub-committees were established and listed below respectively (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Sub-committees of Committee on Professional Development of Teachers and Principals and their respective functions

<i>Sub-committees on</i>	<i>Major Functions (EDB, 2015)</i>
Initial Teacher Education (SCITE)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · advise on policies and measures relating to initial teacher education (ITE) programmes · provide a platform for regular professional exchanges with Teacher Education Institutions (TEIs) and the school sector
Teachers' Professional Development (SCTPD)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · advise on policies and measures relating to the professional development of teachers at different stages, including novice and experienced teachers as well as relevant school personnel, with a view to promoting teaching excellence and professional growth of teachers
School Leadership (SCSL)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · advise on policies and measures relating to the professional development of serving principals, newly-appointed principals, aspiring principals, including vice-principals and middle managers, and members of School Management Committee (SMC)/ Incorporated Management Committee (IMC), with a view to developing school leadership and enhancing the quality of school education


With the establishment of the 3 sub-committees, the members of the sub-committees would make recommendations according to their own Terms of References (ToR) (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Sub-committees of Committee on Professional Development of Teachers and Principals and their recommendation functions

Sub-committee on	Make Recommendations to COTAP on (EDB, 2015):
Initial Teacher Education (SCITE)	(a) professional exchanges with Teacher Education Institutions (TEIs) on how to: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (i) plan, implement and review initial teacher education (ITE) programmes to meet present and forecast needs as well as expectations of both the education sector and the community at large in the light of changing societal needs and expectations, global educational developments as well as related research and evaluation findings; (ii) set desired attributes for ITE graduates with reference to the teacher competencies requirements and review the ITE programmes in the light of the feedback from the key stakeholders including ITE graduates; and (iii) enhance the planning parameters for teacher education provision; (b) the qualification requirements for permitted and registered teachers in the light of the prevailing needs in primary, secondary and special schools and kindergartens; (c) the recognition and comparability of professional qualifications acquired outside Hong Kong for the purpose of teaching in Hong Kong; and (d) other matters relevant to ITE which COTAP may refer to.
Teachers' Professional Development (SCTPD)	(a) the present and forecast professional development needs of teachers and relevant school personnel in the light of changing societal needs and expectations, global educational developments as well as related research and evaluation findings; (b) strategies and ways to develop, implement and evaluate an analytical framework on the competencies of frontline teachers at various stages of their professional development with a view to providing an effective guide for teachers' self-reflection and professional growth as well as for schools' planning on teachers' continuing professional development (CPD); (c) ways to promote and review teacher induction to enhance and sustain the support for novice teachers; (d) ways to facilitate teachers' CPD and nurture the reflective practice of teachers and relevant school personnel; (e) the progress of teachers' CPD with a view to promoting teaching excellence and the professional growth of teachers; (f) strategies for: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (i) enhancing teachers' professional ethics and status; and (ii) attracting talent into the profession, retaining teachers of high caliber and maintaining a healthy turnover; (g) the planning, design, organization and evaluation of CPD programmes for teachers and relevant school personnel to enhance their professional competence along the expert track; (h) the need for conducting educational research and evaluation studies with a view to consolidating experiences as well as disseminating good practices of teachers' CPD; and (i) other matters relevant to teachers' CPD which COTAP may refer to.
School Leadership (SCSL)	(a) strategies and ways to promote principals' continuing professional development (CPD) with a view to enhancing school leadership in the light of changing societal needs and expectations, global educational developments as well as related research and evaluation findings; (b) strategies and ways to develop, implement and evaluate an analytical framework on the competencies of principals at various stages of professional development with a view to providing an effective guide for principals' self-reflection and professional growth; (c) the planning, design, organisation and evaluation of professional development programmes for serving principals, newly-appointed principals, aspiring principals and members of SMC/ IMC to enhance their leadership knowledge and skills; (d) the need for conducting educational research and evaluation studies with a view to consolidating experiences as well as disseminating good practices of school leadership; and (e) other matters relevant to principals' CPD which COTAP may refer to.

In this connection, this paper focuses only on three highlighted areas in Staff Development promulgated by COTAP, namely (1) Initial Teacher Education (ITE), (2) Teachers' Professional Development (TPD) (3) School Leadership (SL). Details of the three implications are listed in the following sections (Figure 3):

Figure 3: Model of "Initial, Professional, Leadership (IPL)" in Staff Development



Implication 1 for Principals on Initial Teacher Education (ITE)

When it comes to the implications of "role of Sub-committee on Initial Teacher Education (SCITE)" on Initial Teacher Education (ITE), there are three major areas (Figure 4), namely *1. Closer ties with TEI, 2. School-based Teacher Attributes & Recruitment Procedures & 3. School-based Objective Teacher Competencies Requirements.*

a) Closer ties with TEI

Principals could maintain strategic partnership with Teacher Education Institutions (TEIs) in Hong Kong. Every year, the major TEIs in Hong Kong such as the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), University of Hong Kong (HKU), Institute of Education (IEd), Hong Kong Baptist University (HKBU) and Open University of Hong Kong (OUHK) offer full-time or part-time initial teacher education programs such as Post-graduate Diploma of Education (PGDE) to aspiring teachers. Generally speaking, these TEI would proactively invite schools to be one of the "practicum schools". However, principals should delegate suitable personnel to link with the TEI(s) so that sufficient, meaningful and organic connection can be established among all stakeholders in the practicum practice, including the student teachers, the practicum teachers, the subject panels, the school principals, the practicum supervisor and the institutions.

Figure 4: Role of Sub-committees on Initial Teacher Education and the Implications for Principals on Initial Teacher Education

<i>Role of Sub-committees on Initial Teacher Education (SCITE)</i>	Implication 1 for Principals on Initial Teacher Education (ITE)
Territory-wide level	School-level
<p>(a) professional exchanges with Teacher Education Institutions (TEIs) on how to:</p> <p>(i) plan, implement and review initial teacher education (ITE) programmes to meet present and forecast needs as well as expectations of both the education sector and the community at large in the light of changing societal needs and expectations, global educational developments as well as related research and evaluation findings;</p> <p>(ii) set desired attributes for ITE graduates with reference to the teacher competencies requirements and review the ITE programmes in the light of the feedback from the key stakeholders including ITE graduates; and</p> <p>(iii) enhance the planning parameters for teacher education provision;</p> <p>(b) the qualification requirements for permitted and registered teachers in the light of the prevailing needs in primary, secondary and special schools and kindergartens;</p> <p>(c) the recognition and comparability of professional qualifications acquired outside Hong Kong for the purpose of teaching in Hong Kong; and</p> <p>(d) other matters relevant to ITE which COTAP may refer to.</p>	<p><u>a) Closer ties with TEI</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • principals can maintain strategic partnership with Teacher Education Institutions (TEIs) in Hong Kong • principals can build closer ties with the university department heads or practicum supervisors to understand the most updated development of ITE • Principals can understand more on the generation characteristics of the newly-recruited teachers for staff management <p><u>b) School-based Teacher Attributes & Recruitment Procedures</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Principals should involve the Subject Panel in all rounds of interview and drafting the school-based Teacher Attributes (TA) they are looking for • Principals could delegate more power to Subject Panel in staff recruitment to demonstrate distributional leadership style <p><u>c) School-based Objective Teacher Competencies Requirements</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Principals could make reference to the previous ACTEQ document on Teacher Competence Framework (TCF) or the updated COTAP documents to revise and align with their own "Performance Appraisal" systems • Principals could set up the School-based TCF to steer the direction of the staff development • Principals could incorporate two major reflective questions into the appraisal system, "where we are now?" and "where we are heading to?" are important to teachers as a "roadmap for their professional development"

But, on the other hand, principals can build closer ties with the university department heads or practicum supervisors in order to understand the most updated development of ITE. As such, principals can understand more on the newly-recruited teachers, especially those "Generation X" teachers who freshly graduated from TEIs.

In addition, they could inform the TEIs that the ITE (Philpott et al, 2014) and teachers' characteristics that they are looking for school and classroom improvement (Muijs et al, 2004) in the light of the global and local educational developments as well as the updated research and evaluation findings.

b) School-based Teacher Attributes & Recruitment Procedures

Each school has its own uniqueness in school culture, its preferences on the people and the teachers they are seeking. During recruitment, some traditional ways of management will involve the middle manager, or the Subject Panel (SP) in the first interview. Generally speaking, for the second interview, the interview panel might comprise only of School Supervisor/ School Manager, Principal or Vice-Principal. Hence, the role of SP is not very strong. It causes some people management issues later on when the SP needs to closely monitor the newly-recruited teachers, while the new teachers might think the real power rests on the principals rather than their SP.

In this connection, principals should involve the SP in all rounds of interview. In addition, principals can discuss with the SP of different subjects for the expected Teacher Attributes (TA) they are looking for. It is also a concrete gesture of power delegation from principal-led recruitment to more middle management-led (by SP) recruitment by demonstrating the distributional leadership style (Hallinger, 2010).

Most importantly, the SP should be given ample chances to observe candidates' individual learning orientation in some "demonstration lesson" of the interview process. Such individual learning orientation might be even more important for workplace learning than other variables (Gijbels et al, 2010). Other than learning orientation, teachers' ability to collaborate with others is also very important (OECD, 2009). Through the preparation of "group discussion or group presentation" in the interviews, SP can pay due attention to this ability of the candidates.

c) School-based Objective Teacher Competencies Requirements

Principals sometimes might be aware of, though in their mind only, their teachers' competency levels, no matter they are weak or strong. Yet, not many of them will discuss with the staff on the "expected level of competency" with clear framework stipulated for teachers' Continuing Professional Development (CPD).

CPD is indeed essential to various stages of teachers' professional lives (Day, 2007). However, sometimes even principals are not aware that "teaching (profession) has poor systems for disseminating new knowledge to the individual teacher (Jensen, 2007). In some worse cases, there might be a lack of "professional follow-up" of teachers in the workplace (OECD, 2009).

For instance, Principals could make reference to the previous ACTEQ document on Teacher Competence Framework (TCF) or the updated COTAP documents to revise and formulate their own "Performance Appraisal" systems in school-based manner. In

addition, Hobson et al (2008) also highlighted that school-centered TCF requirements were significantly more relevant in relating theoretical elements to their daily practice.

It is understood that most secondary schools are aided schools and most increments for teacher salary are nearly "automatic". As such, some principals would conduct the performance appraisals of the teachers in lay-back manner. Yet, with the incorporation of the TCF elements, the appraisal forms of the teachers could be revised in a more data-driven and systematic approach. Unlike other statutory professionals such as doctors or architects who "draw upon research about the effect of their practice so as to inform and improve their decisions", most teachers do not (Hargreaves, 2007).

For novice teachers, the expectation of the principals on their attainment in TCF could start with the beginner level. For mature teachers, they should advance with time in the TCF. They should be able to mentor their peers or subordinates so as to enhance their leadership and management skills, and inspirational skills to induce internal changes at their cognition level (Meirink et al, 2007).

However, there is no need for principals to expect all teachers would achieve same level of attainment in TCF. Yet, it would be necessary for principals to set up the School-based TCF developmental stages to steer the direction and progression of the staff development. For instance, two visionary-based reflective questions should be re-framed into the appraisal system together with the TCF. Reflective questions like "where we are now?" and "where we are heading to?" are important to teachers as a "roadmap for their professional development".

To sum up the implications on ITE, principals can uplift the ITE via the means of building closer ties with TEI, stipulating School-based Teacher Attributes & Recruitment Procedures & setting out School-based Objective Teacher Competencies Requirements.

Implication 2 for Principals on Teachers Professional Development (TPD)

In connection with the implications of "role of Sub-committee on Teachers' Professional Development (SCTPD) on Teachers' Professional Development (TPD)", there are three major areas (Figure 5) which teachers can go through learning process through "practical theorizing" (Hagger & McIntyre's, 2006), namely 1. *Teacher Induction & Mentoring System*, 2. *Reflective Culture*, 3. *Professional Code*, 4. *Career Mapping for Teachers*.

Figure 5: Role of Sub-committees on Teachers' Professional Development and the implications for Principal on Teachers' Professional Development

<i>Role of Sub-committees on Teachers' Professional Development (SCTPD)</i>	Implication 2 for Principals on Teachers' Professional Development (TPD)
Territory-wide level	School-level
(a) the present and forecast professional development needs of teachers and relevant school personnel in the light of changing societal needs and expectations, global educational developments as well as related research and evaluation findings; (b) strategies and ways to develop, implement and evaluate an analytical framework on the competencies of frontline teachers at various stages of their professional development with a view to providing an effective guide for teachers' self-reflection and professional growth as well as for schools' planning on teachers' continuing professional development (CPD); (c) ways to promote and review teacher induction to enhance and sustain the support for novice teachers; (d) ways to facilitate teachers' CPD and nurture the reflective practice of teachers and relevant school personnel; (e) the progress of teachers' CPD with a view to promoting teaching excellence and the professional growth of teachers; (f) strategies for: (i) enhancing teachers' professional ethics and status; and (ii) attracting talent into the profession, retaining teachers of high caliber and maintaining a healthy turnover; (g) the planning, design, organisation and evaluation of CPD programmes for teachers and relevant school personnel to enhance their professional competence along the expert track; (h) the need for conducting educational research and evaluation studies with a view to consolidating experiences as well as disseminating good practices of teachers' CPD; and (i) other matters relevant to teachers' CPD which COTAP may refer to.	<p><i>a) Teacher Induction & Mentoring system</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Principals can firstly establish "Strategic Staff Development Committee (SSDC)" and delegate the SSDC to formulate and check against the Staff Development (SD)-related policy, guidelines and procedures for the novice teachers Principals could explore the possibilities to set up "a 3-year school-based mentoring system" for all new teachers, by offering concrete support of pedagogical knowledge, hands-on skills and psychological companionship <p><i>b) Reflective Culture</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Principal can motivate teachers and enhance their reflectivity with the adoption of competence-based or/ and holistic approach. <p><i>c) Professional Code</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Principals could delegate the SSDC to organize some professional activities on professional code, thereby enhancing teachers' professional ethics and status, as preventive measures for teachers' potential unprofessional act. <p><i>d) Career-mapping for Teachers</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Principals could revisit their own school-based promotion mechanism and formulate clear and objective criteria for promotion so that staff could be motivated by this objective "performance-based promotion" Principals could revisit educational professionals of various posting such as School Development Officer (SDO) of funded projects for school improvement organized by universities, Officers from Education Bureau (EDB), university department academics to share their experience in career development Principals could re-energize the "organizational structure" of the school, allowing more "post titles" to be in place to un-tap teachers various expertise by giving them a sense of ownership

a) Teacher Induction & Mentoring system

For teacher induction, principals could set up their own school-based mechanism. As per existing practice, some of the school-based teacher induction might be a half-day or a one-day workshop. In addition, in some schools, teacher induction package, such as teachers' handbook, guidelines, regulations and procedures have not yet been developed for the novice teachers to follow.

In this connection, principals can firstly establish "Strategic Staff Development Committee (SSDC)", if they have not yet established. Principals should delegate the SSDC to formulate relevant policy, guidelines and procedures for the novice teachers. Moreover, principals could also explore the possibilities to set up "a 3-year school-based mentoring system" (Whitehead & Fitzgerald, 2006) by selecting "model mentors" so that all novice teachers would be supported with pedagogical knowledge, hands-on skills and psychological companion.

In addition, Smith & McLay (2007) and Smith & Hodson (2010) also pointed out the importance of selecting "correct mentor" in enhancing the school-based training and meeting the trainees' training needs. Moreover, some schools would even offer "personality test" for teachers in order to predict their teaching style (Diaz-Larenas, Rodriguez-Moran, & Poblete-Rivera, 2011).

b) Reflective Culture

With reference to relevant literature, principals' effect on student learning is indirect (Zeinabadi, 2014). In this connection, teachers are the soul of classroom in students' learning. They should be reflective in both "theories of actions" (which is believed to work), as well as the "espoused theories" (which in more aligned with and perceived to be general ideals) (Eraut, 2008). When it comes to Teachers' Professional Development (TPD), competence-based approach is not the only approach. Holistic approach is also useful, especially in relation to teachers' reflectivity. Both approaches are with their strengths and weaknesses (Creemers, 2013) with reference to the following contexts.

Competence-based TPD approach is advised to be adopted if the following criteria are met:

- The school TPD is devoid of clear framework, policies and guidelines
- The existing TPD is not specialized and not diversified
- The staff lacks the direction of TPD on what to develop and how to develop
- The staff is still in beginner or intermediate stage of their professional lives

If competence-based TPD is decided to be adopted, the principal should make reference to the external TPD competence framework, such as the TPD stipulated by

COTAP, and to further modify into school-based TPD framework if necessary. In this regard, teachers can be aware of the clear TPD framework, policies and guidelines. They could identify their own areas of development based on their diversification. So, they can plan ahead for what to develop and how to develop by soliciting both internal and external program providers. This approach is specifically to new or beginning schools, or schools with weak or absence of TPD framework.

On the other hand, holistic TPD approach is a good option to consider if the following criteria are met:

- The school TPD is developed with clear framework, policies and guidelines but the TPD is perceived as a routine and mechanical mechanism
- The existing TPD is specialized and diversified on paper but teachers' passion is weak
- The staff knows the direction of TPD on what to develop, how to develop but forgets why to develop
- The staff is in veteran stage of their professional lives but loses their passion and reflectivity

Once holistic TPD approach is taken, the principal should spend much time in understanding why the passion of teachers has been lost. For instance, the principal should listen to teachers' rationale of their "stories behind". Are there any factors for them to demotivate their work and to sacrifice their passion? Generally speaking, principals who are able to articulate the vision well, to inspire subordinates and to love and trust teachers could enhance teachers' intrinsic motivation to revitalize their passion.

As such, as a principal, one should be able to distinguish the two approaches, to understand the criteria in the adoption of the said approach, to consider the contextual implications for adopting or rejecting for the said approach.

c) Professional Code

In the past years, there has been public concern over the professional ethics of the teachers, especially in the areas of sex crime, professional distance with students and professional distance with colleagues. In this regard, Principals should delegate the SSDC to organize some professional activities on "Sex Discrimination Ordinance", "Teachers' Professional Code" and past "convicted cases" by the court. With such preventive education, teachers' professional ethics and status would be safeguarded with due public trust.

d) Career-mapping for teachers

Under the new academic structure, "career-mapping" has been well-designed for students. For teachers, rather, their "career-mapping" might be overlooked by some

principals. As similar to other aided sectors, the turnover rate of teaching profession is not very high unless there is a serious "mal-management" or "extreme scenarios".

Moreover, in view of the existing staff establishment structure, for instance in secondary schools, there are usually around 2 Principal Graduate Master (PGMs), 16 SGMs (Senior Graduate Master) in a school of 60 teachers. As one can imagine, the promotion exercise within a school would not be very frequent. This is because the SGM seldom resigns after promotion and would continue to serve in the same school till retirement. Therefore, some teachers might "lose their morale" while they are waiting for promotion for many years. Some teachers might perceive that "promotion is a matter of seniority, rather than on performance ground". As a result, some energetic teachers would lay back or even "lose their direction or morale" before they are promoted.

To tackle with this problem, principals could revisit their own school-based promotion mechanism and formulate clear and objective competence criteria for promotion so that staff could be motivated by this objective "performance-based promotion". Specifically, the schools could specify the requirement of promotion on knowledge, skills, understanding, values and attitudes pertaining to their work and curriculum, just as the eight key competences that the European Union (EU) countries are recommending (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2006).

On the other hand, schools can also list the cognitive skills like numeracy, literacy, knowledge as well as the non-cognitive skills like social, behavioral and emotional competences that needed by the school (Yano, 2013).

In addition, principals could also make use of their social relationships (Daly et al, 2014) to invite educational professionals of various sectors or postings such as School Development Officer (SDO) of funded projects for school improvement organized by universities, Officers from Education Bureau (EDB), university department academics to share their stories of career development so that teachers know "school-based promotion" is not the only option in their career development.

Apart from the above, principals could consider re-energizing the "organizational structure" of the school. Principals could allow more "post titles" to be in place so that teachers' different expertise can be untapped by strengthening their sense of ownership. For example, when compares to the past, it has been increasingly popular for some schools to have 2 Assistant Principals (AP) in place, in addition to the established post of Vice-Principal (PGM). But in reality, the two APs are at the rank of SGM only. But these two "additional posts" enhance the possibility and degree of "distributional leadership". It also facilitates the succession plan of the school for the preparation of the second-ladder and third-ladder in a school in the long run.

Likewise, Principals can explore the possibility of establishing "Assistant Senior Form Panel Head", "Assistant Junior Form Panel Head", "Assistant Counselling

Master" so that more staff can be involved in the decision-making process of the schools. For details, Principals could make reference to the successful examples of Evangel College and St Paul's Co-educational Education College in career-mapping for teachers.

As a concluding remark for implication on TPD, principals could encourage teachers' practical theorizing by strengthening teacher induction & mentoring system, building reflective culture & setting out professional code.

Implication 3 for Principals on School Leadership (SL)

In relation to the implications of "role of Sub-committee on School Leadership (SCSL), there are three major areas (Figure 6) in School Leadership (SL), namely 1. *Principal's Continuing Professional Development (CPD)*, 2. *Strengthening Training to "Teacher School Manager"* & 3. *School-based Educational Research*.

Figure 6: Role of Sub-committees on School Leadership and the Implications for Principals on School Leadership

<i>Role of Sub-committees on School Leadership (SCSL)</i>	Implication 3 for Principals on School Leadership
Territory-wide level	School-level
(a) strategies and ways to promote principals' continuing professional development (CPD) with a view to enhancing school leadership in the light of changing societal needs and expectations, global educational developments as well as related research and evaluation findings; (b) strategies and ways to develop, implement and evaluate an analytical framework on the competencies of principals at various stages of professional development with a view to providing an effective guide for principals' self-reflection and professional growth; (c) the planning, design, organisation and evaluation of professional development programmes for serving principals, newly-appointed principals, aspiring principals and members of SMC/ IMC to enhance their leadership knowledge and skills; (d) the need for conducting educational research and evaluation studies with a view to consolidating experiences as well as disseminating good practices of school leadership; and (e) other matters relevant to principals' CPD which COTAP may refer to.	a) <i>Principal's Continuing Professional Development (CPD)</i> · Principal could keep oneself networkable with various stakeholders to keep abreast of the latest trend b) <i>Strengthening training to "Teacher School Manager"</i> · Principals are advised to devise a school-based TSM induction guide so that the sustainability of the TSM can be enhanced in the form of knowledge management c) <i>School-based educational action research</i> · Principals are advised to set up "Committee on Educational Action Research" so that teachers might have some informed practice after conducting the research.

a) *Principal's Continuing Professional Development (CPD)*

Being a Principal is undoubtedly stressful to certain extent, especially under the global competitiveness and external accountability among various local or international leagues tables (Hawker, 2013). Principals are expected to "foster a compelling vision for the school, model desired behaviours of professional educators, coach faculty to align with their skills to pursue the school vision, manage organizational resources effectively and fairly, mediate the inevitable conflicts" (Tschannen-Moran, 2009; 2014). In a nutshell, principals' leadership style is of utmost importance.

Moreover, principals need to formulate strategies to promote students' learning with sound "leadership orientation" and "high-quality interpersonal relationships" (Forsyth & Adams, 2014). They should also keep enhancing their school leadership in order to respond to the societal needs and expectations, global educational developments, updated research and evaluation findings and regional trend. As such, principals should keep themselves networkable with various stakeholders to keep abreast of the latest trend. With outstanding social relationship, principals can relay external resources to schools (Daly et al, 2014; Spillane & Kim, 2012).

On the other hand, principals who seldom network with external world are not visible in the professional circles. They could not promote the school development much with their limited visibility. Hence, principals can extend their networking to different stakeholders in the education field to build up a community of learning as a prioritized task. For those experienced principals, they can even build network beyond the scope of the education field only. Nowadays, cross-field collaboration is common and mutually-beneficial.

Moreover, principals are advised to create bonds of trust to inspire his or her own teachers to practice their power delegation and succession plan (Handford & Leithwood, 2013; Zeinabadi, 2014). Principals who practiced the above well are veteran in "tapping teachers' expertise in decision-making" (Forsyth and Adams, 2014).

b) *Strengthening training to "Teacher School Manager"*

Under Incorporated Management Committee (IMC), some teachers are required to serve as a "Teacher School Manager". Yet, the traditional training to "Teacher School Manager (TSM)" might not be very strong after he or she completes the school manager training offered by the Government.

Principals are advised to devise a school-based TSM induction guide so that the sustainability of the TSM can be enhanced in the form of Knowledge Management (KM). "Sense-making" for Teacher School Manager has been important when teachers need to internalize the differences across school various contexts (Yin, 2013). Moreover, through principal's entrusting, the Teacher School Manager would probably be less engaged in self-protective behaviors, which may impair the sense of professional

community in a school.

c) *School-based educational action research*

Traditionally speaking, teachers would like to attend formalized training such as a Doctorate degree or Master degree if they want to pursue some academic training with strong theoretical foundation. However, some teachers would have hesitation on the "theory or principles" of the educational theories they acquired. As such, principals should identify those who study doctorate degree, master research degree, or possess extensive research experiences to lead a small school-based research. Educational Bureau of Hong Kong Government also promotes action research in school communities via the School-based Support Offices (SBSS) to assist schools to foster a culture of action research. Yet, the principals should be alert of the following three main difficulties encountered by teachers. First, some teachers also face the difficulties of school support in undertaking their studies such as the time, funding and the modification of work arrangement when clashing the studies. Second, some teachers might divert most of their energy and time to their studies, and might place their administrative or teaching tasks aside they undertaking their studies. As a result, washback effects might appear on school administration.

To tackle with this issue, conducting appropriate scale of school-based educational action research would significantly enhance teachers' receptivity towards the issue as the whole research is more of data-driven, context-specific and scenario-relevant to the teachers concerned under the instructional leadership of the Principal, thereby improving students' performance (May & Supovitz, 2011)

As such, principals are advised to set up "Committee on Educational Action Research" so that teachers might have some informed practice after conducting the research. To well balance the workload of teachers, principals could choose to conduct a theme-based educational research once per two years. There are two advantages at least. First, teachers might not be exhausted. Second, teachers would have time to disseminate their finding and good practices into each panel for further modification and integration, regardless in the form curriculum development meetings, teacher supervision meetings or TPD seminars (Hanford & Leithwood, 2013).

With "normative pressure" from school leaders on conducting educational research, effect on teachers' individual teachers' classroom practice might be improved (Penuel, Frank, & Krause, 2011; Penuel, Sun, Frank, & Gallagher, 2013).

To summarize implications on SL, principals can pursue their excellence in their principal's CPD, strengthen training to "Teacher School Manager" and conducting school-based educational action research.

Limitation

Though this paper aims to introduce the tripartite structural model of IPL in Staff Development originated in the COTAP, it does not lead to any introduction of any theoretical framework. Rather, it elaborates in details how the IPL can be applied in school for pragmatic actions. Moreover, the three aforesaid-mentioned implications are derived from the author's extensive school consultancy experiences. Yet, it takes time for schools to tryout and review the suitability for their daily practices.

Conclusion

To conclude, this article illustrates the three highlighted developments of the COTAP in Education Bureau in the HKSAR in Staff Development (SD) in (1) Initial Teacher Education (ITE), (2) Teachers' Professional Development (TPD) and (3) School Leadership (SL). Through the discussion of the three highlighted developments, a tripartite structural model "Initial, Professional and Leadership (IPL)" was proposed to explain the three useful policy implications for principals on staff development.

With the aid of the IPL model, this article presents three useful implications for principals in local context.

First, principals can strengthen the Initial Teacher Education (ITE) of the school in three major areas, including building closer ties with Tertiary Education Institute (TEI), stipulating school-based teacher attributes & recruitment procedures, as well as designing school-based objective Teacher Competencies Requirements (TCR) for teachers to refer to.

Second, principals could improve the Teachers' Professional Development (TPD) in three major areas, such as establishing teacher induction & mentoring system, cultivating reflective culture, and fostering the in-depth understanding of the professional code.

Third, principals could re-engineer School Leadership (SCSL) in three major areas, like enhancing Principal's Continuing Professional Development (CPD), strengthening training to "Teacher School Manager" and conducting school-based educational research.

With the implementation of the aforesaid strategies derived from the IPL model, principals could ultimately benefit students' learning, as a whole, with the provision of quality education. In addition to the three aforesaid implications, as a final remark, principals are also advised to keep abreast of the latest development proposed by the COTAP, such as the key development item stipulated in *Odyssey to Excellence. Progress Report* in May, 2015.

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Objectives

1. To enhance the quality of practice and teaching of public administration in Hong Kong;
2. To provide a forum for the identification and discussion of public administration issues; and
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Electronic copy of submissions in Microsoft Word for Windows is required. In terms of style, articles should be single-spaced, with 2.5cm margins. Pages, including those containing illustrations, diagrams or tables, should be numbered consecutively. Notes should be numbered and placed at the end of the article. The manuscript should be preceded by an abstract of no more than 200 words. It should be a summary of the entire article and not the conclusions alone. The submission should be accompanied by a brief biographical note on the author(s), indicating academic/professional position, institutional affiliation, research interests, and major publications.

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Scott, I. (2010). *The Public Sector in Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Fong, P. & Postiglione, G. (2011). Making Transnational Collaboration Work: The Case of China's Hong Kong System. In Sakamoto, R. & Chapman, D. (Eds.), *Cross-border Partnerships in Higher Education: Strategies and Issues*, 169-190. New York: Routledge.

Mok, K.H. (2003). Globalization and Higher Education Restructuring in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China, *Higher Education Research & Development*, 22, 117-129.

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CONTENTS

EDITORIAL

Peter K.W. Fong

ARTICLES

The Past, Present and Future of the Rule of Law in Hong Kong

Rimsky Yuen

The Critical Importance of Political Will in Combating Corruption in Asia Countries

Jon S. T. Quah

Learning and Executive Development in Reforming the Singapore Public Service
from 1959 to 2001

James Low

Negotiating the Minimum Wage Level in Hong Kong's Business-driven Regime:
A Neopluralist Perspective

Ying-ho Kwong

Philosophical Foundation of Hong Kong Tertiary Civic Education Policy:
Formation of Trans-cultural Political Vision

Andrew T. W. Hung

The Reconstitution of Advisory Committee on Teacher Education Qualifications to
Committee on Professional Development of Teachers and Principals:

Implications for Principals on Staff Development

Vincent W. L. Wong

ISSN 1022-0275



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